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ABSTRACT
This study attempts to examine the chances that South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki has in
changing the unbalanced relations between the powerful countries of the North and the
marginalised developing world. In doing so, it investigates how the leaders of Northern
countries received the New Africa Initiative which was launched by a group of African heads
of states, including Mbeki, at the G-8 summit in Genoa in July 2001.
Unlike preceding works, this study takes a systemic perspective. The power relations in
international affairs are pointed out with specific consideration of South Africa's status as an
emerging middle power in the international system. Special recognition is furthermore given
to the question as to whether there is currently a global re-think under way about
globalisation, the ideology of neo-liberalism and the interaction with poor countries in the
global political economy.
The study comes to the conclusion that despite the fact that South Africa as a middle power is
subordinate to the powerful countries of the North when it comes to effecting global change,
and despite the outcomes of Genoa that do not indicate that an equitable global order is close,
there are considerable trends and developments visible which support what Mbeki is trying to
achieve. As a consequence, it is contended that his "Global Initiative" has a much better
chance of being successful than the plea for a New International Economic Order in the
1970s.
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OPSOMMING
Hierdie studie poog om die volgende te ondersoek: die waarskynlikheid dat Suid-Afrika se
President, Thabo Mbeki, die ongebalanseerde verhoudinge tussen die magtige lande van die
Noorde en die gemarginaliseerde ontwikkelende wêreld kan verander. Gevolglik word gekyk
in hoe die leiers van die Noordelike lande die "New Africa Inititiative", wat in Julie 2001 by
die G-8 spitsberaad in Genoa deur 'n groep staatshoofde van verskeie Afrikalande (Mbeki
ingesluit) bekend gestel is, ontvang het.
Anders as in vorige studies, word 'n sistematiese benadering in hierdie studie gevolg. Spesiale
aandag word verder geskenk aan die vraag of daar huidiglik 'n globale heroorweging
onderweg is. met petrekking tot _globalisering, die ideologie van neo-liberalisme en die
hantering van arm lande binne die globale politeke ekonomie.
Die studie 'kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat daar merkbare neigings en ontwikkelinge is wat
Mbeki se werk ondersteun. Dit is ten spyte van die feit dat Suid-Afrika, as middelrnag,
ondergeskik is aan die Noordelike lande wanneer invloede op globale veranderinge ter sprake
is, en nieteenstaande die gevolge van Genoa, wat geensins aandui dat 'n regverdige globale
bedeling naby is nie. Gevolglik word geargumenteer dat hierdie "Globale Inisiatief' 'n beter
kans het om suksesvol te wees as die pleidooi vir 'n "Nuwe Internasionale Ekonomiese Orde"
tydens die 1970s.
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CHAPTER I
In troducti on
Measured against its stated objectives,
neo-liberalism has failed demonstrably.
Hein Marais I
1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS: THE RE-DISCOVERY OF THE NORTH-SOUTH PROBLEM
When, in 1990, the fall of the Berlin Wall marked the global victory of liberalism over
communism, many saw in this the beginnings of a more peaceful and prosperous world. Now,
eleven years later, the picture painted then of "The end of history" (Francis Fukuyama, 1989)
and the start of a "New world order" (George Bush, 1989) seems far away. Instead of setting
the stage for a world order in which the improved chances for international co-operation were
used responsibly in order to spur economic growth and bring about a less contentious world,
the end of the Cold War has not eradicated tension between global blocks. In fact, one could
say that it merely repositioned the geographical line of contention. While it was previously
positioned between East and West, the new world order characterised by the divide between
North and South.
Admittedly, the North-South problem is not a recent phenomenon to which the demise of East
West rivalry gave rise. However, it was overshadowed by the overarching East-West conflict.
The disappearance of this meta-conflict later opened space for attention to focus on the North-
South conflict which had been seething under the surface of the East-West tension. But this is
not the only reason why the North-South issue has re-attracted global attention. Another
development which takes great responsibility for the re-discovery of the 'old' North-South
problem is the degree to which this problem, the gap between the two spheres of economic
development, has deteriorated over the past decades. What started with the 'lost decade' for
developing countries in the 1980s has - with increasing globalisation - advanced to
unprecedented dimensions during the 1990s. According to the UNDP's Human Development
Report of 1996, "the gap in per capita income between the industrial and developing worlds
tripled, from $5,700 in 1960 to $15,400 in 1993". "Of the $23 trillion global GDP in 1993,
$18 trillion is in the industrial countries - only 5 trillion in the developing countries, even
IMarais, 1998:
115.
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though they have 80% of the world's people." (UNDP, 1996: 2)2 At the beginning of the new
millennium the world is thus confronted with an unprecedented degree of global inequality,
which, as the UNDP testifies, has been exacerbated by a growing globalisation process.' With
the continuation and ever increasing speed of this process, the prospects for the majority of
developing and least developed countries, of which two thirds are in Africa, looks gloomy.
"In Sub-Saharan Africa the number of people living below $1 a day level has grown ...Recent
World Bank estimates, based on a 'business as usual'scenario of continuing slow growth and
recurring crisis, show that by 2008 the same number of people may still be living on under $1 a
day .... In fact, the numbers rise in Sub-Saharan Africa by nearly 40 million." (Wolfensohn, 2001)
Recognising these points of tension in the global economy, one is tempted to agree with Hein
Marais that "measured against its stated objectives, neo-liberalism has failed." Instead of
bringing about increased wealth for all nations, it achieved "a massive redistribution of wealth
in favour of the rich." (1998: 115). For James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank,
"these figures call in question the ways in which the world has been doing development",
seeing that "[p ]overty remains intractable despite economic growth in many countries."
(Wolfensohn, 2000)
The failure of neo-liberalism goes hand in hand with the failure of the institutions of
international co-operation, many of which have been put in place to ensure the smooth
functioning and growth in an interdependent world, such as the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) with its
successor, the WTO. Instead of serving as fora of global co-operation, these organisations,
created under US hegemony, have become means of advancing Northern dominance in the
world political economy (Nel et al, in Cilliers, 1999). Equally, the United Nations
development system did not succeed in altering the reality of marginalisation. In fact, the
number of poor nations has risen in the past 30 years from 25 to 49 (Lambrechts, 2000: 15;
Wadula, 2001: 2). Other indicators such as the increasing occurrence of systemic shocks or
the fact that world growth has halved in 1998, make more and more people question the
reasonability and justification for the principles of the Washington Consensus (Marais, 1999).
2 Such aggregate figures naturally hide the differentiation within the group of developing countries in terms of
economic development. Disaggregation reveals that, while a number of East Asian and Pacific countries did
relatively well and improve the look of the figures on the part of the developing world, the condition in other
poor countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, deteriorated greatly (Wolfensohn, 2000; Broad and Cavanagh,
1995/96: 20-24).
3 It should be pointed out here as well that, due to the globalisation processes, not only the income gap between
countries but also within countries widened. (See on this point Wood, 1997)
2
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On the basis of such considerations, Jackie Cilliers draws the conclusion that "[c]learly, the
new century requires a new multilateral order similar to the process which occurred at the end
of the two world wars earlier this century, and that eventually provided the framework that
contained the Cold War to a proxy conflict and prevented mutually assured nuclear
destruction. But the obstacles to the achievement of these ambitions are truly awesome and
would require a very carefully co-ordinated campaign among like-minded countries ...."
(Cilliers, 1999).
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this politico-economic environment of deteriorating conditions for the majority of poor
countries, it is Thabo Mbeki who takes up the task of working towards this necessary new
multilateral order and engages in a new attempt at changing the currently inequitable global
system.
His programme is not the first attempt to address North-South inequality and bring about
global change. An earlier attempt was the claim for a New International Economic Order
(NIEO) of the 1970s. This initiative, however, bore little success. It did evoke a certain degree
of recognition on the part of the industrialised countries, but was eventually rejected by a
USlBritish alliance at the last North-South Summit in 1981 (Breytenbach, 1995: 233; United
Nations University Press, 2001). Considering the failure of the NIEO movement, the question
arises as to whether Mbeki's programme has any chance to lead to global change and the
improvement of the international role and economic integration of the South, considering the
continuing dominance of the North.
As will be shown in this study, recent events indicate that the global political environment is
currently conducive to change and that Mbeki might be able to exploit this situation for his
cause: greater equity in international affairs. He is confronted, however, with the persisting
situation whereby a group of rich and powerful countries is determining global political and
economic outcomes.
3. PURPOSEOF THE STUDY
Considering this problem, this study evaluates Thabo Mbeki's "Global Initiative", that is, his
attempt at effecting the reform of the international community, from a systemic point of view.
3
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It asks, and attempts to shed light on the question, as to whether Thabo Mbeki's attempt has
any chances of leading to a "transformation of a world driven by globalisation" (Mbeki, 1998)
and eventually to a "new world order of prosperity and development for all and equality
among the nations of the world" (Mbeki, 1998) as pledged by him. In particular, it assesses
the structural conditions for global change and evaluates whether the global political climate
is supportive of Mbekis pronounced ambition of achieving a greater recognition of the
interests of the South in international affairs.
4. QUESTIONS FOR INVESTIGATION
This is addressed through examining the following sub-questions:
• What exactly is Thabo Mbeki aiming at with his global programme? What kind of change
does he actually envision? What is his strategy, what means is he using and what are his
tactics?
• Which factors are driving Thabo Mbeki in his global equity activism? What influence do
his personal characteristics, domestic South African politics and the international system
have on his ambition and its style and strategy?
How is power distributed in world politics, and how much scope has Thabo Mbeki as
president of a middle power to influence and effect change in world affairs?
How conducive is the global political environment currently to change? Do the attacks on
the United States of September 11,2001 indicate a twist in favour of the poor?
What are the effective outcomes of the G-8 summit in Genoa of July 2001, and how are
they to be interpreted?
•
•
•
5. THE "MBEKI INITIATIVE" IN EXISTING LITERATURE
Since it is a relatively recent phenomenon, "Mbeki's Global Initiative" has not yet caught
effusive attention in academic writing. The term itself is not widespread, and when used it
often evokes the association with Thabo Mbeki's renaissance programme for Africa. The term
"Mbeki Global Initiative", however, encompasses more than solely Mbeki's engagement for
Africa. It is used mostly in the works of Nel, Taylor and Van der Westhuizen. Although not
the sole analysts of Mbeki's new North-South dialogue policy, it is mainly Nel, Taylor and
4
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Van der Westhuizen (2000) who give the term a global scope as opposed to restricting it to an
initiative on Africa. It is in particular Taylor who, despite confining it to a global trade
framework, takes up the term in this fashion and defines it as Mbeki's "reformist agenda at
the various multilateral bodies that deal with global trade issues" (Taylor, 2001: 62). Apart
from them, Landsberg (2000b) recognises the wider scope of Mbekis programme when
talking of "Mbeki' s External Initiative on Africa and the Global South".
The fact that only few scholars talk of Mbeki's North-South policy in this specific fashion
does not mean that the above-mentioned authors are the only ones who attribute an
increasingly important aspect of South Africa' s foreign policy to the person of its current
president. Patrick Bond and Howard Barrell also draw this connection. But whereas Barrell
stays rather descriptive and relatively uncritical - his only criticism being that Mbeki's
message is "not particularly original" (2000a: 29) - Bond investigates the limits of Mbeki's
project by analysing speeches and discussion of key events and processes. The latter contends
that "Thabo Mbeki cannot change the world" (Bond, 2000: 4). His conclusion rests on a
variety of findings about the insufficiency of Mbekis approach, two of them being
questionable alliances and the "reluctance to question received wisdom" (2000: 7). Mbekis
greatest deficiency, according to Bond, is his own inconsistency and contradictory behaviour.
On the one hand, he bows to and even promotes globalisation and the chances it bears for
South Africa and developing countries in general, whereas on the other hand, he criticises
exactly this developmental model which has brought about globalisation and the negative
effects on poor countries that come with it. The result of such an approach can merely be
"minor tinkering" (Bond, 2000: 7), a programme which lacks the radical thinking necessary to
lead to real, structural change.
The accusation of such inadequacies can also be found in works of Nel, Taylor and Van der
Westhuizen, who come to the same conclusion that, even though Mbeki' s rhetoric talks of the
'transformation' of the world order, Mbeki will not be able to achieve this with the approach
taken. Investigating Mbeki's policy for change from a critical perspective, they find that it
rests on a "restricted focus on power and privilege" (Nel, et aI, 2000a: 3). According to them,
Mbeki and his advisors accept much too uncritically the existing power differentials and are
too fixed on states as the constituents of power in the global political economy. A narrow
approach like this can in the end only lead to piecemeal change, that is, minor corrections of .
imbalances, but not to a radical re-structuring of the underlying order.
5
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Another stream of available literature about Thabo Mbeki's international engagement deals
with the change in international economic policy making. In the fact that the G-8 have started
to open their exclusive circle to leaders and organisations of the periphery Nazeem Mahatey
sees the "beginning of a new dialogue between the North and South ... [which bears] the
promise of a major strategic partnership to benefit the neglected people of the world." (2000:
12). By listing recent global events in which Mbeki played a key role in representing the
South's interests, Mahatey gives a description of the change in North-South politics.
South Africa's foreign policy from 1994 has received considerable attention in academic
literature, and a number of writers draw the link between the country' foreign and domestic
policy when trying to interpret the former and how and why it emerged the way it did. Chris
Landsberg, for instance, shows that "South Africa's foreign policy [in Mbeki's first year in
office] ... reinforces the theory that domestic and foreign policies are closely entwined"
(Landsberg, 2000b: 75). With South Africa itself being a reflection of global inequality,
Landsberg points out that South African domestic and foreign policy both work towards
closing the gap between rich and poor. But while this link is frequently stated, few have put
South African foreign policy making into a broader picture. The works of Taylor and Vander
Westhuizen do take account of this (Taylor, 2000; Van der Westhuizen, 1998). When trying
to understand Pretoria's recent foreign policy, which is strongly driven by Thabo Mbeki, they
put it into context with the constraints of domestic forces and the global economic order. Both
depart from the observation of incongruity between South African domestic and foreign
policy and ask the question about the underlying reasons for this. Using the critical theory
perspective of Cox, both Taylor and Van der Westhuizen discover the difficulties of policy
making in a vice-like setting, in between the pressures of a hegemonically organised global
political economy and the interplay of social forces in South Africa. While there is external
pressure on South African policy makers to bow to neo-liberalism, which has over the past
years increased income inequality, there is also domestic pressure to serve the dominant social
forces that have been included in the corporatist project of crisis response.
Looking at the consequences of the domestic pressures and constraints of South African
society, both Taylor and Van der Westhuizen draw the link to the importance that
multilateralism plays in South Africa's foreign policy. The relevance of multilateralism for
South Africa is widely taken up in academic writing. Whereas most writers are content
merely to describe South Africa's multilateral foreign policy, Taylor, Vander Westhuizen and
6
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Nel, who in various studies dig deeper and ask for the rationale behind this behaviour, bring
the support for multilateralism together with South Africa's role as a middle power. Maxi
Schoeman (2000) also deals with South Africa as a middle power in the international system
but stays rather descriptive when defining South Africa as an 'emerging middle power' on the
basis of Robert Cox's definition of a middle power.
6. GAPS IN EXISTING LITERATURE AND RATIONALE OF THE STUDY
The study of scholarship on the "Mbeki Global Initiative" has brought forth the result that
existing literature
• circles around ideological aspects of Mbeki's approach,
predominantly adopts a critical approach, and
does not cover the latest developments.
•
•
Taking these findings into consideration, this study focuses on judging Mbeki's programme
from a systemic angle. It attempts to confirm results achieved in preceding studies which
concluded that the ideological direction his approach is taking at the moment will not enable
him to achieve the transformation of the global community as envisaged in many of his
speeches.
The evaluation presented here is intended to point out the impact of the inconsistency in
Mbeki's North-South policy, namely the incongruency between his envisaged goal and the
ideological framework in which the concrete objectives are embedded. It is furthermore
intended to analyse whether the strategy Mbeki has chosen is sufficient to lead to his goal or
whether he ought to make strategic adjustments in dealing with the power giants in the North.
An important point of the analysis is to draw a picture of the current condition of the global
political environment and assess the conduciveness for change in world affairs. It is assumed
that the global political climate, the pressures from civil society, and critical official voices
are highly relevant factors in support of Mbeki's interests. By doing this, the study
emphasises the overall receptiveness for any kind of trans- or reformatory initiatives and
movements aiming at correcting global power and wealth imbalances.
7
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7. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The theoretical framework will mainly be relevant to the latter part of the study, the
evaluation, as it is here that my thesis will be developed. A positivist approach is underlying
the results of this work. That means that the international system will be investigated as it is
"out there" rather than in a normative fashion, as the aim is not to develop ideas about how
change can be effected but to 'realistically' judge its possibility.
The evaluatory part of the study, moreover, takes a state-centred approach. It is assumed that
states are - still - the principal actors in world politics. Thus, they will be looked at as the
constituting forces for international co-operation and the constituting elements of the
international system. The existence and growing influence of non-state actors on internal
politics are acknowledged, particularly as influencing state behaviour through their leaders,
but are assumed to be ultimately not decisive actors in the system since it is still states that
ultimately make decisions in international politics.
Realism has been criticised widely and many of its shortcomings have been stressed, as well
as several of its basic assumptions challenged, with later theoretical thinking about the
interaction of states. Apart from any wishful thinking, however, I believe that realism is still a
very relevant theory when investigating state behaviour and that the latter is still aptly
described by many of realism's assumptions. Within realism, politics are an important force
behind any policy with economic impact in international relations. Thus, as Stephen
Greenwold puts it, realism provides "insightful and reliable explanations of the international
economic policies that states pursue" (Greenwold, 1999). In the global political economy "the
fear of relative, not absolute, gains and losses constitutes a barrier to free trade." (Greenwold,
1999). I am particularly convinced that North-South relations to a great extent work according
to the assumptions of realism. Why else did the European Union not grant South Africa a
more favourable trade agreement in 1999, particularly when it comes to agriculture? Why has
the debt of poor countries not yet been cancelled by creditor countries despite all the rhetoric
about it? Why is it that Africa and the poorer countries usually lose out in international
negotiations? Or why is there not faster progress in international trade negotiations?
Political realism takes into account the power differentials in international politics, which is
the fundamental problem underlying the North-South issue and any attempt to change this
divide. These power differentials are based on differing economic capabilities. To use a realist
8
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framework of looking at the world makes further sense as Mbeki himself seems to operate in
the confines of assumptions central to a realist perspective. His approach is not only highly
centred on states as the ultimate building blocks of co-operative behaviour, but it also accepts
power differentials between them (Nel et al., 2000a: 3) and thus does not question the
hegemonic organisation of the current global order. Any change in this 'conservative'
framework is doomed to be merely limited change since "the type of change realism ... can
lead to is only piecemeal change, or reform. It is not radical change because it leaves the
roots of the world situation unaffected." (Nel and McGowan: 1999: 63) Any evaluation of
Mbeki's attempt at bringing change to the global community - based on his programme and
its assumptions - can from the start only take place in this confined framework.
However, as many have criticised, realism does not have the capacity to explain state
.•.
behaviour fully and entirely, and to rely strictly on realism's assumptions about the nature of
the international system and its view about the relevant actors in international affairs
constitutes a "restricted focus on power and privilege" (Nel and Taylor, forthcoming: 19).4
Since they are led and influenced by people, states do not exclusively act in "rational" self-
interest, but rather may be affected by moral considerations. Thus the realist view is balanced
with a (neo- )liberal institutionalist view on international politics in this study. This version of
liberal theory is particularly suited for a study of this kind since it concentrates on the issues
of the international political economy. (Jervis, 1999: 45) It is contended that the two
approaches are reconcilable since "liberal institutionalists claim to accept realism's root
assumptions." (Mearsheimer, 1994: 16)
The liberal school of thought acknowledges the complex and interdependent nature of the
world, believes in the commonality of states' interests and rejects the zero-sum thinking of
realism. Furthermore, even though co-operation is not impossible in a realist's world, "most
liberals think that co-operative behaviour will increase the equity and mutual benefit of
interstate treaties and regimes." (Travis, 1994: 252l Thus, in a liberal world, change for the
better, moving towards pareto-optimum, is possible (Nel and Me Gowan, 1999: 62). And
whereas realists are sceptical about the disappearance of the North-South conflict (Travis,
1994: 255), liberals "contend that foreign-policy officials have considerable choice in
4 These, however, are the assumptions that Mbeki's programme for the South's upliftment rely on. It takes power
differentials as given and focuses on states as primary actors in the current order.
S In fact, as outlined by Jervis, a neo-liberalist's world is not characterised by more co-operation than is a
realist's. Neo-liberalists, however, see much more unrealised or potential co-operation than realism. (1999: 47)
UNIVERSITEIT STEl~~~OO~"9
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upgrading common interests and in acting morally so as to forge a more just world order"
(Travis, 1994: 253). Institutions as coordinated patterns of behaviour act as quasi media
through which co-operation takes place. Liberal institutionalists regard international
institutions and non-state actors as significant world actors which improve the availability of
information, reduce transaction costs and help overcome the permanent conflict-ridden nature
of international relations as assumed by realists.
It is in these perspectives that the potential for greater and more fair co-operation between the
rich North and the much poorer South will be assessed. An interplay between two theories is
used as this mixture is capable of explaining state behaviour better than either of the two
alone, I believe that both realist and liberal thinking do playa role when states interact.
8. METHODOLOGY
The study is a qualitative assessment of a particular foreign policy initiative of South Africa's
president Thabo Mbeki, which is his activism to end the marginalisation of Africa and the
entire South. It will take a descriptive, explanatory and evaluatory approach. The evaluation
assesses the potential to lead to global equity as well as to improve the livelihoods of the poor.
It is mainly undertaken on the example of the G-8 summit in Genoa of July 2001.
8.1 Definition of key concepts
8.1.1 Global Equity
Contrary to equality, the concept of equity includes notions of fairness and justice. It does not
necessarily aim at and lead to equality, i.e. the similar treatment of like units. The adjunct
"global" within the bounds of this work will be understood and used to express the "inter-
national" use of the concept, equity between nations. One form of global equity in this
understanding would thus be the equal distribution of rights between nation states and would
in its ideal form include international co-operation on equal terms in which no nation or block
of nations is marginalised or discriminated against.
10
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8.1.2 North/South
The terms North and South will in this study be used in a global developmental perspective".
As such, the terms do not so much refer to geographical locations but carry a much more
developmental meaning, expressing divergences in economic development and wealth.
between nations. The global North first and foremost refers to the G-7 countries, but in a
wider sense also includes the range of OECD countries. The concept of North also
incorporates global institutions under American and European dominance such as the World
Bank, the IMF, the WTO. North, hence, encompasses the developed world, which has been
supporting and promoting the neo-liberal project which has triggered the process of
globalisation for the last few decades. The South, in contrast, constitutes the developing
world, i.e. countries with a far lower level of economic .development, relatively marginalised
in the world economy and not having been capable to reverse global economic conditions to
their inclusive benefit.
Equally, the terms core and periphery can be used as substitutes for North and South.
8.1.3 Multilateralism
Multilateralism will in this study be used in a normative sense as defined by Ruggie (Taylor,
2000: 23). As such, the notion of multilateral ism includes more than just describing a process
in which three or more actors are coordinating their policies. Multilateralism thus becomes
much more a way of organising international life on the basis of a set of rules. (Caporaso and
Ruggie, in Nel etc, 2001: 10).
8.1.4 Neo-liberalism
The concept of neo-liberalism stands for a politico-economic ideology which is based on a
liberal philosophy of the separation of politics and economics. As such, it proclaims the
withdrawal of politics from the economic sphere and consequently promotes policies of
deregulation, privatisation and liberalisation. By limiting the role of governments, neo-
liberalism has been widely accused of restricting the sovereignty of nation states and
undermining their free choice of determining development paths.
11
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The concept is understood as the idea on which the process of globalisation, i.e. the growing
interdependence of states and markets, rests.
Neo-liberalism is linked to the global order in the way that it is the dominant development
model imposed by the hegemon, in this sense the United States, supported by its allied
partners in the G-7.
8.1.5 Power
Power is understood in this framework as structural power as defined by Susan Strange, that
is, as "power to shape and determine the structures of the global political economy within
which states, their political institutions, their economic enterprises [et cetera] ... have to
operate" (Strange, 1988: 24-25).
Power itself is based on capabilities and determines how a state is positioned in the
hierarchically structured international system. On top of this order stands the hegemon which
can determine the rules. In this sense, it is assumed here that structural power lies with the
North, led by the United States of America, which has been strengthened by the "emergence
of a number of more or less equal advanced powers that derived similar benefits from the
world the US had been protecting" (Steven, 1994: 294)7 and are aligned with the US in the G-
78. It is the latter's dominant neo-liberal thinking that has determined the global system in the
form of the North-South divide.
6 The use of the two terms in these meanings goes back to the Brandt Reports of 1980 and 1983, "North-South:
A Programme for Survival" and "Common Crisis: North-South Co-operation for World Recovery" and they have
since been used in this meaning.
7 The Gulf War and the intervention in Somalia are two examples which give expression to this 'shared' global
hegemony. In both cases the advanced powers supported the US militarily and financially.
8 The G-7 was created in the 1970s by the then French President Giscard d'Estaing and the German Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt as a kind of anti-institution against the low effectiveness of large international meetings. The
meetings of the group of most powerful nations thus constituted a more informal framework for the discussion
and co-ordination of international policies (Bayne, 1995: 494).
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8.1.6 Hegemony
Hegemony in the sense used here is enabled through the power dynamic outlined above.
This conception of power and hegemony is broadly based on the realist view and differs from
the one used by Gramsci and Cox (as used in Taylor) in the way that the basis for hegemony
are still states, not societies or classes.
In this meaning and definition, the concept hegemony rests on the assumption that power lies
with the G-7, and therein with the US. This is affirmed by Susan Strange, who contends that
"the United States has not in fact lost power in the world market economy. They may have
changed their mind about how to use it, but they have not lost it. Nor, ... are they likely to do
so in the foreseeable future." (Strange, 1988): 28). "As that economy has grown and spread,
the source of its power has shifted from the land and the people into control over structures of
the world system." (Strange, 1988: 235). However, as the rest of the G-7 have increased their
capability in the ,global political economy relative to the United States, and as they are
supportive of the ideals spread by US, they are seen as having become constituents of this
hegemony.
8.2 Operationalisation
The study at hand proceeds from the negative findings of previous studies on the prospects for
the "Mbeki Global Initiative" to lead to a transformation of the global community. On the
example of the reaction of the G-8 to the pledges of African leaders at the Genoa summit it
tests the presumption that the South-driven attempt to changehas little potential to be
successful by outlining the power relations in the global political economy and the effective
outcomes of the Genoa summit
8.2.1 Unit of Analysis
As the title indicates, the main object of analysis is Mbeki's "Global Initiative", that is, the
foreign policy approach of South Africa's current president which addresses the global divide
between the North and the South. The evaluation will target the international system as its
unit of analysis and will examine how Mbeki' s policy impacts that system.
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8.2.2 Data Used
A variety of data types and sources has been used for this study. One main pillar of evidence
are primary data in the form of ANC governmental policy documents. Another primary
source constitutes speeches made by Thabo Mbeki, both since achieving presidency in 1999
as well as before, during his time as Deputy President under Nelson Mandela.
Secondary data takes the form of articles and publications, mainly academic journals and
books but also newspapers and (media) journals. For the analysis of Thabo Mbeki's
characteristics, biographical data and information have been used due to the impossibility of
receiving these information through a personal interview. In addition to that, the findings are
based on publications from NGOs which have partly been sourced through the internet. The
internet has also served as source for up-to-date information on statistical data. Other
statistical information has been sourced from publications of international organisations such
as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme.
9. CHAPTER OUTLINE
Altogether the study focuses on three basic questions, each of which is dealt with in one
chapter:
What is the Mbeki Global Initiative?
Why is Mbeki leading it?
What are the chances that this initiative will lead to its aim of global change in the
form of a world order in which the South is no longer politically and economically
marginalised?
In this way, Chapter II traces the roots of the Mbeki Initiative back to the policies of the ANC
and shows that the ideas on which the initiative rests are inextricably intertwined with the
philosophy of the ANC and have been important pillars of ANC foreign policy strategy in the
early 1990s, before it became the majority party. This tracing of the roots will then turn its
focus onto Thabo Mbeki's influence on ANC and GNU-policy from the mid-1990s in order to
assess whether and why it is actually justified to associate the person of Thabo Mbeki with
South Africa's outstanding position in Africa and the group of South countries. Is it not
simply South African foreign policy which follows party-political priorities? Having pointed
14
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out this justification, the content of the global programme is explained by outlining both
Mbeki's underlying idea as well as its specific points. The last section of this chapter deals
with the strategy applied by Mbeki and thus outlines the means and the tactics he uses.
Chapter III analyses why Mbeki is so equity-active on the international scene. The aim of the
chapter is to show the different possible entry-points into this question as reflected in the
literature. A three-level approach is used to show that there is not simply one sphere which
drives Mbeki but that his global activism is most likely a conglomerate of various factors and
forces. It is contended that his "Global Initiative" is influenced by his personal traits and
biography, South Africa's policy-making models of corporatism and tripartism as well the
country's status and role in the international system.
Based on the preceding findings, Chapter IV deals with the most important and central
question of the study, as outlined in section three. Borrowing from the latter part of the
preceding chapter, the discussion looks at why the international system is a barrier to the
success of Mbeki's ideas. It will, however, also be pointed out that there are a number of
trends under way that support Mbeki's vision.
Apart from giving an overview of the arguments and findings put forward in this study, the
Conclusion gives recommendations on Mbeki's policy behaviour vis-a-vis the North and
closes with a brief outlook into the near future.
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"Ex Africa semper aliquid novi!"
Pliny the Elder!
1. INTRODUCTION
"Out of Africa, there always comes something new." Applying this Latin proverb to Thabo
Mbekis ambitious foreign policy to achieve global change, the renaissance of the African
continent and the resurgence of the entire South in global affairs, one can certainly find some
truth in it. Africa and the rest of the developing world has for many years been relatively quiet
about the fact that it benefitted less and less from the economic system which the Western
powers put in place after World War II and which, as was pointed out in the previous chapter,
increasingly excludes the less developed part of the world. Admittedly, it is not the first time,
that Africa raises its voice against the dominance of the North. The struggle against colonialism,
the attempt together with the rest of the periphery to create a New International Economic Order
in the 70s, as well as the establishment of various South-based institutions, with UNCTADat the
forefront, come into mind here.
The new millennium sees a renewed attempt to address the problem of the North-South divide,
with the South African president Thabo Mbeki as its protagonist. The following chapter will deal
with this new attempt and outline what the "Mbeki Global Initiative" actually entails. This is
done in order to show its dimensions and lay the foundation for an evaluation as to whether an
approach of this kind has the potential to be successful in its objectives. The crucial questions to
be answered here are concerned with the idea or vision behind this effort, and the concrete goals
contained therein. What are the goals and objectives of the initiative and how is Mbeki bringing
it into action? That is, what is his strategy, his tactics and means, to achieve his goal? Concrete
policy initiatives such as his African Renaissance Programme, the Millennium Plan for African
Recovery (MAP), or the New Africa Initiative will be dealt with and put into context. First of all,
however, the roots of Mbeki's initiative will be traced back to and put into context with South
Africa's commitment towards multilateral diplomacy.
! This latin proverb, saying "Outof Africa, there always comes something new", is found in the works of Pliny the
Elder. He, however, is not the original author but only the furthest traceable source.
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2. WHY MBEKI'sINITIATIVE?
2.1 ANC Foreign Policy Prior to Mbeki's Presidency
The commitment towards Africa and the rest of the marginalised part of the world is not a very
recent element of South Africa's foreign policy. It predates Thabo Mbeki becoming president in
1999, as it is strongly intertwined with the nature and policy of the African National Congress
and can be found in ANC policy documents pre-1994 as one of the party's foreign policy
priorities. Certainly, before its re-integration into world politics with the general elections in
April 1994, South African foreign policy goals and necessities differed immensely from the
GNU's. The pariah state's international relations were restricted and had to rely on bilateral
relations. Economically, foreign policy was at that stage influenced by the country's need to
generate foreign exchange in order to service foreign debts.
Officially, the committment towards the greater African region and the South only started to
feature in South Africa's external relations after 1994 when the ANC took over power. However,
an ANC discussion paper (ANC, 1993) affirmed already in 1993 the need for a new South
African foreign policy to "reflect the interests of the continent of Africa". The strengthening of
economic links, enhanced political co-operation and the fight against the debt burden were
identified to be among the critical issues which a new South African external policy had to
consider.
Nelson Mandela's 1993 Foreign Affairs article "South Africa's Future Foreign Policy"
underlined the ANC's pre-GNU commitment for any future South African policy to take "the
concerns and interests of the continent of Africa" into consideration next to goals such as to
promote peace, democracy and human rights, in addition to economic development and the rule
of international law. (Mandela, 1993: 87) The commitment towards Africa is repeated in the
ANC's 1994 policy document on international affairs (referred to in ANC, 1997). This document
outlines equally the commitment to the development of the African continent and the Southern
African region. In particular, it goes even further to include the "[d]evelopment of a just and
equitable world order" as well as putting "the whole of the South [...] [as an issue] at the top of
the international agenda."
Despite the fact that such rhetoric of international commitment is found throughout ANC
statements on foreign policy, its implementation and the GNU's practical commitment towards
them has differed and gone through several developmental phases. Nel et al. distinguish among
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four phases of multilateral commitment in the foreign policy of the GNU since 1994. According
to them, commitment was particularly high in the early years, the period between 1994 and 1996,
which can be interpreted as a "heroic" phase during which South Africa - in a highly
personalised approach (Van der Westhuizen, 1998; 114) - was able to achieve a number of
foreign policy successes. Cases in point are Mandela's involvement in East Timor, Zaire and the
Lockerbie negotiations with Lybia (Nel et al., 2001: 114).
Whereas the early days were characterised by the redefinition of the international standing of a
newly re-integrated South Africa and the predominance of enthusiasm of political change,
diplomatic pragmatism took over after Pretoria had earned a number of criticisms. Two key
examples are its contentious diplomatic stance towards Nigeria and its role in the indefinite
extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.' In both cases South Africa's actions raised criticism,
particularly from the developing world, which accused Pretoria of violating the Pan-African
solidarity and mingling too much with the West. (Van der Westhuizen, 1998: 447 - 448)
Besides these two cases, the GNU has generally been criticised for a lack of consistency between
formulated policy ideals and their practical implementation (Mills, 2000: 263; see Van Aardt,
1996: 107). The GNU was not coherent when it came to putting its foreign policy principles into
practice', particularly when it was confronted with the dilemma of having to decide between
economic interests or idealistic policy behaviour. South Africa was, for example "reluctant to
speak out against human rights abusers and unable to base policy on principle when financial
matters were involved" (Van der Westhuizen, 1998: 446), a dilemma which reflected the
domestic struggle between two contentious foreign policy camps which were prevalent in South
Africa's society, the internationalist and the neo-mercantilist. Experiences like the ones
mentioned here, in which the GNU realised the difficulties of an idealistic and moral foreign
policy; triggered greater pragmatism. At the same time in the GNU's foreign policy making (Nel,
et al., 2001: 113) which eventually led to a more routine approach in its diplomacy from 1998.
2 In the case of Nigeria, South Africa was criticised for her unilateral call to boycott and exclude the country from
the Commonwealth after the Abacha Government's human rights abuses (see van Aardt, 1996: 115). In the NPT
case, South Africa gave in to US dominance against the interests of Southern countries. Another event causing
likewise criticism was the arms sale to Syria. (Nel et al, 2000) (Nel et al, 2001: 114; Van der Westhuizen, 1998:
447).
3 Spence ascribes this to the fact that the new goverment had not defined a clear national interest nor found the
balance between morality and economic interests in foreign politics. An example in which this dilemma between
morality and interests arose was the arms trade to Syria (Spence, 1998: 160). According to Mills the GNU's foreign
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The difficulties South Africa experienced at that time in relation to making the 'right' diplomatic
choices, on the other hand, influenced the GNU to endorse multilateralism more as a "'safer'
diplomatic option in dealing with thorny issues" (Nel, et al., 2001: 114).
Both South Africa's current internationalist orientation (Van der Westhuizen, 1998: 444),
expressed in an ethical diplomacy seemingly beyond self-interest;' and the endorsement of
multilateralism as a good way of escaping the difficulties and criticisms of a unilateral foreign
policy, have been integral parts of the ANC's and the GNU's diplomatic agenda since the early
1990s. The question then arises as to why these policy characteristics have suddenly become so
strongly and almost exclusively linked to South Africa's second democratically elected president
after apartheid, Thabo Mbeki. Put differently, is it indeed justified to associate South Africa's
international reform policy of improving the fate of the South with South Africa's current
president, considering the ANC's and GNU's long-standing commitment towards Africa, the
South and its embracement of multilateralism?
2.2 Foreign Policy after Mandela - Mbeki Takes Over
Thabo Mbekis role as an important formulator of South Africa's foreign policy does not start
only with his taking over presidency in June 1999. Already during his presidency-in-waiting, that
is beginning in 1998, he took a crucial role in the re-emergence of South Africa's
internationalism. According to Botha, Mbeki not only became an essential player in South
Africa's foreign policy stance during this time, but he virtually "became the architect of South
Africa's foreign policy." (Botha, 2000: 4t, One of the most important and far reaching products
from this time was the creation of the vision of an African Renaissance, which from 1997
featured explicitly in the ANC's policy objectives.
2.2.1 Evolution of the African Renaissance
Shortly after his denomination as accessor to the presidency, Mbeki stressed the notion of the
"African Renaissance" in the majority of his speeches. His I am an African speech at the
policy principles did provide a framework for foreign relations but were not clear enough when it came to policy
goals, objectives and strategies (Mills, 2000: 262).
4 This has been openly confirmed by Mandela himself on various occasions (Corrigan, 1999: 7).
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ceremony in which the new constitution was adopted in 1996 refers - even if not explicitly as
from 1997 - to his vision of an African Renaissance. He placed emphasis on the fact that
"Africa reaffirms that she is continuing her rise from the ashes. Whatever the setbacks of the moment,
nothing can stop us now! Whatever the difficulties, Africa shall be at peace. However improbable it
may sound to the skeptics, Africa will prosper!" (Mbeki, 1996).
At this time, however, the notion of the "African Renaissance" was not yet filled with political,
social and economic content. The first step in giving the concept a more concrete expression was
in April 1997, at the summit "Attracting Capital to Africa", held in Chantilly, Virginia, and later
at his African Renaissance statement at the Gallagher Estate on August 13, 1998. Inferring from
these speeches, the African Renaissance can be described as a call for "Africa's political,
economic and social renewal" (Landsberg, 2000a), for setting an end to Africa's exploitation and
marginalisation. Politically, Africa must establish democracy and eliminate failed systems. On
the economic side, Mbeki pointed out the need for economic reform as a prerequisite for Africa's
economic regeneration. The social element was directed at ending the man-made suffering on the
continent (Botha, 2000: 4-8).
The idea of Africa's Renaissance has a mobilising, endogeneous approach, and as such is
supposed to be a "framework through which we [Africans] can empower the continent to act for
itself and its interests" (ANC, 1997), as well as a process "where Africans themselves are to find
solutions to African problems" (Botha, 2000: 8). The way in which the African Renaissance
concept works towards the empowerment of the continent, the political liberation from Northern
dominance and determination as well as global economic integration, is a vision which is
strongly linked to South Africa's multilateral foreign policy goals of fighting for the re-
emergence of the African continent and the achievement of a "more equitable world order"
(ANC, 1997).
Soon after Mbeki had introduced the concept, it was taken up by the ANC and featured
prominently in the GNU's strategy as one pillar on which its multilateralist goals rested. As such,
the African Renaissance is not a vision which is exclusively connected with Thabo Mbeki
himself. However, its emergence must be attributed to Mbeki, who, while still deputy president,
"gradually, took charge of foreign policy" (Botha, 2000: 4).
20
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER II
Mbeki's "Global Initiative": Roots, Contents, Tactics and Criticisms
2.2.2 Emergence of a Global Approach
Similar efforts by Thabo Mbeki towards the renaissance of Africa have to be seen and
interpreted in the wider context of global order and North-South relations. This became evident
in August-September 1998 with Mbeki's speech at the Twelfth Summit of the Non-Aligned
Movement in Durban. Another event which indicated Mbeki's increasing use of his renaissance
ideas constituted the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in November 1999. During
this meeting Mbeki actively represented the developing world by playing a significant role in
getting the Commonwealth leaders to endorse the Fancourt Declaration on Globalisation and
People-Centred Development, a political document in which the Commonwealth contries
recognise the needs of the global South and emphasise the need for a people-centred
development.
From late 1999 onwards, i.e. with Thabo Mbeki having taken over power from Nelson Mandela
"an element of global 'heroism'" returned to South African foreign policy making (Nel, et aI.,
2001: 113/115) with this wider commitment to the marginalised part of the world, including the
entire global South. This revived "global heroism" took up the earlier, but so far little practised,
commitment to fight for the economically disadvantaged countries of the world and to
enhancetheir opportunities in the global political economy. During this time, Thabo Mbeki
emerged as "global campaigner for the developing world" (Nel, et aI., 2001: 115) and the main
force behind the foreign policy goal of addressing the global lack of equity. Now, two years after
Thabo Mbeki took office in Pretoria, it has become clear as to where a major part of his efforts
are targeted. During his time as president, he has proven his role; if not as the "developing
countries' single most" (Barrell, 2000a), then at least as an important speaker on behalf of the
South. One of the more recent initiatives introduced by him is the Millennium Plan for African
Recovery, MAP, in co-operation with Nigeria's Olegun Obasanjo and Algeria's Abdelaziz
Bouteflika.
In concluding this point, the roots and emergence of the "Mbeki Global Initiative" have been
traced back. It was pointed out that South Africa's commitment towards Africa's and the less
advanced world's development is not Mbeki's idea alone. However, it has to be attributed to a
great extent to Mbeki's efforts that multilateralism has re-established its place high on Pretoria's
foreign policy agenda from 1998/1999 onwards. The pursuance of global equity goals, in fact,
was only introduced during Mbekis presidency (Nel, et aI., 2001: viii). As a consequence, it can
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be contended that Mbeki played the leading role in developing South Africa's foreign policy
strategy to lift Africa out of its marginalised position and to promote its interests and those of the
developing world. As head of government since 1999, he has increasingly been using his
position as the most important actor in foreign policy making next to the minister of foreign
affairs Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and has engaged actively in campaigning for global structural
reforms. By this, Thabo Mbeki was an important force behind South Africa moving from a
foreign policy of rhetoric and the search for general positions towards policy implementation.
(Mills, 1999: 13).
The previous years saw the emergence of a series of other African leaders with a similar mindset
to Mbeki's. These have joined him in his effort to campaign for Africa. Despite this, however,
Mbeki remains a driving force in this new grouping.
Having outlined why it is justified to talk of a "Mbeki Global Initiative" the contents ofhis
"Global Initiative" will now be explored in more detail.
3. THE "MBEKI GLOBAL INITIATIVE" - PLEA FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER?
3.1 Mbeki's Vision for Change
"We must see our Movement [...] as a serious instrument for the transformation of a world driven
by the process of globalisation, so that we meet the objectives of the upliftment of our peoples"
(Mbeki, 1999a). In this fashion Thabo Mbeki addressed the participants of the twelfth NAM
Summit in Durban on 31 August 1998, one of the first occasions in which he openly pronounced
his vision of a new world economic order, a "new world order of prosperity and development for
all and equality among the nations of the world" (Mbeki, 1998).
With powerful statements of this kind, Mbeki has been turning against the negative powers of
globalisation, which have, instead of bringing about a more prosperous and stable world, led to a
global structural divide between the North and the South of unprecedented severity. It is this lack
of global equity which he is campaigning against. His pronounced objective is to eradicate
poverty and to end the South's economic marginalisation and disadvantaged standing in the
global division of labour. By criticising the status quo of "growing inequality within and among
countries" (Mbeki, 1999b) and arguing that a more just world is to the benefit of all, including
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the countries of the North, Mbeki makes a plea for the evolution of "global solidarity", and a
more humane world (Nel, et al., 2000: 2).
"[T]he political leaders of our contemporary world", as Mbeki contended, "should face up to the
question as to whether universal human values have any place at all in the ordering of human affairs.
How can it be permissible that some die of hunger and curable diseases and exposure to the elements
because of poverty and perish in civil wars driven by competition for virtually non-existent resources,
when the volumes of wealth concentrated in some parts of our globe are themselves becoming
something of a destructive force!" (Mbeki, 1998)
Mbeki is condemning the skewed distribution of global power in favour of the North and giving
expression to the urgent "need to restructure the parameters of the international economic
system" (Mbeki, 1999a). Such remarks, almost revolutionary in their tone, seem to give a clear
indication as to which standpoint Mbeki is arguing from and suggests the assumptions on which
he is basing his Global Initiative. (Landsberg, 2000a) His questioning of the effects of the
dominant form of economic development which has emerged in the more developed parts of the
world underlines this impression that he is lobbying for some .sort of post-paradigm, a post-
orthodoxy, post-Washington Consensus or simply a "global rethink of 'neoliberal' [...]
philosophy" (Bond, 2000: 3) in favour of global social democracy. However, as Nel, Taylor and
Vander Westhuizen (200 I) have pointed out, what sounds like revolutionary ideas and the call
for rebellion is in reality a rather mild programme. This becomes visible if one looks at the
concrete demands Mbeki is filling this vision with.
3.2 Objectives and Issues of Mbeki's "Global Initiative"
Mbeki does not stop at painting a vision. His pledge is filled with a concrete list of priorities for
action, mostly targeted towards the developed West, since the problems of global imbalances
"cannot be solved except in the context of the global human society" (Mbeki, 2000e). This being
so, Mbeki's efforts mostly converge around issues of global governance and "typical" South
issues which are not new on the agenda (Breytenbach, 1995: 231) These include debt relief, aid,
trade and investment, technology transfer and the democratisation of global governance through
reforms of international institutions (Mbeki, 2000d; Barrell, 2000a: 29).
The following are the most prominent of his objectives:
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3.2.1 Debt Cancellation
The debt problem of developing countries, most of it accumulated during the oil crisis of the
1970s and 1980s, is one of the most important barriers preventing poor countries from improving
their developmental status. Due to their monetary and financial implications, foreign debts are
preventing growth by impeding investment and directing resources away from where they are
most needed. The majority of African states still suffer from severe debt problems and spend
enourmous percentages of their total annual exports on interest and debt servicing.
Initiatives to ease the debt burden of developing countries do exist. One notable example is the
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, which was put in place in 1996 by the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The criteria, however, are set so high that only few
countries meet the requirements.' In addition to this, the G-8 has given this issue· considerable
room for discussion in two recent meetings. In Cologne (Germany) the G-8 presented a debt
reduction plan in the form of the 'Cologne Initiative', and in Okinawa (Japan), in July 2000,
Mbeki spoke on behalf of the NAM to lobby for an increase in the number of eligible countries
through flexibilising the requirements for debt cancellation, as well as greater debt reduction for
these countries" (On further debt reduction actions see ECOSOC, 1999). Action, however, has
been sparse so far. Despite the fact that 41 countries worldwide, 33 of them in Africa, are now,
after the broadening of the eligibility thresholds, potentially eligible for the HIPC, only half have
been accepted into the HIPC programme while another 13 are still waiting to be approved (Debt
reduction, 2001). Other commitments by industrialised countries to date have also fallen short.'
(Le Pere, 1999: Mahatey, 2000: 12f; Landsberg, 2000a; Dent and Peters, 1999)
With the debt problem unchanged, any potential improvements in aid flows and other revenues
to poor countries will not be able to lead to economic and social development.
5 Among other problems with the designing of the eligibility criteria, indicators actually serve the purpose of
creditor countries, according to Kajimpanga (1998).
6 It is interesting to see and important to note here that while Thabo Mbeki is lobbying globally for debt relief, the
South African government is reluctanct to support the Jubilee 2000 campaign to write off South Africa's debt (Van
der Westhuizen: 2001: 50).
7 The measures taken through the Cologne Scheme represent, according to Jubilee South, only 12 % of the debts of
a1l41 HIPCs (see Le Pere, 1999: 2).
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3.2.2 Resource Transfers and Foreign Investment
The trend in development aid has been negative in recent years. Most developed countries are far
from sacrificing the 0.7% of their GNP, the amount which developed countries committed
themselves in the 1970s to give annually to poor countries. This target has never been reached,
and, instead of moving up to this level, official development assistance (ODA) has seen a decline
since the end of the East West conflict so that expectations of the "peace dividend" have not
materialised.8 Apart from some Scandinavian countries, the average ODA ranges around 0.25%,
with the United States only contributing a mere 0.1% of its annual GDP to the total annual
amount (Sachs, 2001: 49). The amount of aid flowing to sub-Saharan Africa has shrunk from
US$ 18.9 billion in 1994 to US$ 15.1 billion in 1997, and the least developed countries' share of
the aid has declined from US$ 16.7 billion in 1995 to US$ 13.5 billion in 1997 (South Centre,
2001). In addition to these continuing drops in ODA, developing and least developed countries
are now, after the end of bipolarity, competing with the newly democratising countries of the
former Eastern Block for aid. Moreover, development aid is strongly influenced by strategic
considerations and thus in many cases does not get where it is actually needed most.
A similar picture is apparent with foreign investment. Apart from the fact that only a mere 25%
of private capital flows goes to developing countries, this amount is also distributed extremely
unequally. China alone is the recipient of more than 60% of this capital. Considering that 80% of
all private capital flows to the developing world is destined for only twelve countries, with
Argentina, Brazil, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Mexico on top of the list, Africa, and
particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, is left virtually devoid of investment capital (South Centre,
2001).
Despite the growing trend to replace aid through trade, resource transfers are still crucial for the
developing world in order to "arrive at the point where they can achieve their own sustainable
development" (Mbeki, 1998). This being the case, Mbeki is calling for both more aid and better
management of it (Mbeki, 2000b).
8 Itmust also be considered here, that the official ODA figures do not represent what actually arrives in recipient
countries. The real amount provided and reflected in developing countries' balance of payments differs from official
data, which are received from donor countries since much of the ODA never leaves the North. (South Centre, 2001).
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3.2.3 Overcoming the Digital Divide
Modem technology has reduced the distance between nations, on the one hand, while on the
other hand it has emerged as the main cause of the growing gap between advanced and less
advanced countries. While the developed North progresses with enourmous speed as a result of
new technological advances, be it in communication, bio-technology or other technology-driven
fields, the South is more and more left behind. This leaves it with ever-diminishing chances of
catching up or simply keeping. Estimations suggest that science and technology spending of the
24 richest countries is 250 times higher than that of the 50 poorest countries (Nhlapo, 2000: 19).
Due to the central role technology has achieved for economic growth and development,
developing countries' access to knowledge must be improved if they are to advance. In
realisation of this, Western heads of state committed themselves at their July 2000 summit in
Okinawa to establish a Digital Task Force intended to engage in developing IT policies and
regulations (Landsberg, 2000a).
As another concrete measure for the facilitation of technology transfer, Pretoria wants the
provisions for the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement to be
operationalised and further enhanced in order to make possible the transfer of technology on
preferential terms (Mahatey, 2000: 13/32).
3.2.4 Levelling Playing Fields in Global Trade
Equal market access has been a plea from the South for years, but despite global fora and
organisations to reduce barriers to trade and create a fair and free trading system, the conditions
of global trade are still greatly imbalanced. Particularly in agriculture, which constitutes a crucial
pillar of many developing and emerging countries's economies, playing fields are still massively
unlevel, In addition to the fact that developed countries spend enourmous amounts on
subsidising their agricultural sectors, developing countries face import barriers for agricultural
produce, such as tariffs reaching up to five times more than those levied on manufactured goods.
This hits developing countries particularly hard, as many of them, among them South Africa, are
dependent on exporting agricultural products as an important source of foreign exchange.
(Annan, 2001: 19; The Economist, 2001b: 25). Therefore, Mbeki is requesting a change in "the
rules and regulations that make the world trading system unbalanced and biased against the very
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countries that need a fair trading system, so that these countries, which represent the majority of
humanity, benefit from international rules of trade." (Mbeki, 2000b).
"We should address ...to negotiate a rebalancing of the agreements that govern the world trade and
international systems. There is a range of areas where the outcomes of previous multilateral
negotiations have been weighted against the developing countries. This is not only restrictive of our
development but will soon also be a restraint on the continued growth and prosperity of the world
economy." (Mbeki, 2000a)
3.2.5 Democratisation of Global Governance
Considering that the power relations in the Bretton Woods organisations are skewed towards
countries like the USA9 or that developing countries are not treated as equal partners in the
WTOIO, thus manifesting the structural imbalance between North and South, Mbeki is promoting
the democratisation of global financial and trading institutions:
"For example with regards to the WTO there is a need to re-examine their rules [...]; and the
structures of governance require reform to give greater weight to the concerns of the countries of
the South. In a sense this would lay a basis to address the profound imbalances in the structure of
the global economy." (Mbeki, 2001)
With regard to the United Nations system, which has failed to ensure a just and equitable
distribution of global resources, Mbeki calls for their long-discussed restructuring "so that it
pursues an agenda truly determined by the united nations of the world". (Mbeki, 1998). Apart
from this, Mbeki has also put the reassessment of the role of the G-7 on its global agenda.
3.3 Trans- or Reforming?
When investigating Mbeki's vision together with its objectives, two observations are striking.
Firstly, most of the concrete points are merely aimed at mitigating adverse effects of
globalisation and at slightly improving the misery of poor countries - leaving them dependent on
the "goodwill" of rich countries. Secondly, it is clear that Mbeki's objectives do not support his
9 In the Bretton Woods organisations (IMF and World Bank) the voting system includes an element of
representation. The more shares, the more say a country has. The US holds 17% of the shares while 85% of all votes
are necessary to effect change. Without the approval of the US, thus, no proposal has a chance. (Bond, 2000: 17/18).
10 One striking example of how developing countries were not taken as equal partners is Seattle, where they were
just shut out of key meetings. (See Islam 2000: 36-37).
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vision. Whereas on the one hand, he talks of a new world economic order and the emergence of
global solidarity, on the other hand, he does not question the dominant order of the global
economy and the exertion of power. In fact, Mbeki does not bring any new ideas into the debate
of how to overcome poor countries' marginalised position in the world economy.
It must thus be suspected that his ideas about a real 'new world order' are nothing but
propaganda in whose realisation he himself does not seem to believe. It is on the basis of this
discrepancy that his Global Initiative has been termed "reformist" rather than "transformative"
(Nel, et al., 2001).
Having outlined the central points of Mbeki' s global agenda and shown that they lack force, it
will now be shown how he is pursuing this programme.
4. MBEKI'S MEANS, STRATEGIES AND TACTICS
4.1 International Leadership Positions
Since the country's re-integration into the international community, South Africa took over a
number of leadership responsibilities in a variety of multilateral organisations (see Nel, et al.,
2001: 1-2). In this, the country did not merely express her commitment towards multilateralism;
the influential positions were used much more to contribute greatly to international agenda
making. Among the variety of chairmanships, that of the Non-Aligned Movement, from 1998 to
2001 stands out Before and during his presidency, Mbeki made use of this forum as a strategic
platform from which to launch his call for change in the working and principles of the global
economy. As referred to earlier, the then Deputy President's opening address of the Twelfth
NAM conference in Durban in 1998 stands out as one of his most expressive mobilisation
speeches in which he called the South to unite against the unequal distribution of powers and the
negative impacts of globalisation. Another significant and influential leadership task was the
chairmanship of UNCTAD, which South Africa obtained between 1996 to 1999, and which
Mbeki used as another platform to call for the unification and mobilisation of the South. Apart
from these international responsibilites, Mbeki is increasingly making use - or allowed to make
use - of meetings of the Group of leading Western heads of states to make his plea for the South.
28
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER II
Mbekis "Global Initiative": Roots, Contents, Tactics and Criticisms
Whereas the chairmanship of multilateral organisations since 1994 and his presence at Northern
heads of states' summits represents the tactical means to launch his Initiative, the concept is
"built on two legs - one each in the developing and developed worlds" (Mills, 1999: 8).
4.2 Uniting the Divided South: Increasing the Bargaining Position versus the North
In many instances, the South is not a monolithic block with one single face, nor is it a uniform
collection of weak states (Breytenbach, 1995: 232). The diverse array of positions taken by
developing countries in WTO trade negotiations is but one case where the divisions within the
South, and the negative consequences of these diverging positions, becomes evident. There do
exist a number of South-driven institutions, with UNCTAD, NAM, G-77, OAV, and ASEAN to
name but a few. With the major exceptions of the G-77 and OPEC, however, these multilateral
organisations "seldom act collectively on behalf of Southern interest externally" (Breytenbach,
1995: 232). Thus, the South has rarely anything to counter the North.
Mbeki's strategy is targeted at exactly this deficiency which impacts negatively on the South's
bargaining power vis-a-vis the North. His message is that the South, if it wants to be heard,
needs to organise itself and co-ordinate in order to be heard and taken seriously (Mbeki, 2000a).
Co-operation among organisations of the South, thus:
"should be further strengthened and increased in order to harmonise the efforts and activities with a
view to avoiding duplication and bringing greater coherence and consolidation to the unity and
promotion of common interests on various global issues as well as in furthering greater interaction
among the developing countries." (Mbeki, 2000d). "Furthermore, it is vital that the NAM and the
Group of 77 plus China should have a common, coordinated and strategic approach in their
interactions with organisations of the North such as the G8 and the European Union." (Mbeki, 1999a);
"Further, it would seem to us that as a movement [NAM] we must radically review the manner in
which we make our interventions into such importnat organisations as the World Trade Organisation,
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank." (Mbeki, 1998)
Another aspect of South-South co-ordination which Mbeki and his counterparts are increasingly
realising is economic co-operation. Instead of concentrating solely on traditional trade patterns
along North-South lines, Mbeki made a call at the Mercosur Summit in Brazil in December 2000
for a "concerted and systematic" (Mbeki, 2000a) approach among the countries of the South to
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refocus their attention on improving economic ties between each other and thus reduce the
dependency on rich countries:
"As developing countries we have to radically restructure our economic relations and increase
economic cooperation, investments and trade flows between our countries in addition to the existing
historical patterns of economic interaction with the developed countries of the North." (emphasis
added) (Mbeki, 2000a)
4.2.1 G-South
As a co-operation movement which is particularly targeted towards strengthening the role of the
South in the WTO, South Africa has initiated and is leading the establishment of a so-called G-
South (sometimes also called G-5). This initative emerged from organic co-operation at the
WTO Seattle Conference in late 1999 and is an alliance of strategic players in the South who
maintain strong positions in their respective regions. The then ad-hoc alliance of five countries
with common interests, namely Brazil, Egypt, India, Nigeria and South Africa, proved successful
in obtaining concessions from politically and economically more powerful trading partners at
Seattle and is now intended to be a forum of middle income countries with a common agenda so
that they may pose a counterweight to the rich countries' superiour bargaining power. They are
supposed to represent developing countries' concerns and interests and to ensure that these are
taken seriously in the upcoming WTO negotiations planned to be held in Doha, Qatar. As such,
the G-5 will follow in the footsteps of UNCTAD, which was founded to deal with trade issues
among developing countries, but has proven to lack the necessary power to make an impact in
GATT rounds (Lewis, 2001: 21). The G-5 is hoped to prove more effective and to be taken more
seriously than the G-15, G-22 or G-77 (DT!, 2001b). There are plans to expand this G-5 over
time into a G-8 of the South with, China featuring prominently in this line-up as an even stronger
counterweight to the Northern alliances of G-7 and G-8.
4.2.2 Nigeria, Algeria and Senegal: MAP and NA!
Among the G-South, a particular alliance has emerged: between South Africa and Nigeria. Their
countries' leaders show a "remarkable degree of convergence in their foreign economic
strategies" (Landsberg, 2000a) and both see themselves as spokespersons for those countries
which are negatively affected by globalisation. Among others, Mbeki co-operates with Nigeria's
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Olegun Obasanjo and Algeria's Abdelaziz Bouteflika as strategic support partners for his
Millennium Plan for Africa (MAP), a plan of action to lift the African continent out of its
economic paralysis (Dludlu, 2001 a: 11). At the latest G-7 summit in Genoa in July 2001, the
three leaders presented the most recent document with which Africa approaches the North for
support, the New Africa Initiave (NAr). This programme is a merger between MAP and
Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade's previously competing Omegaplan."
4.3 Revitalising North-South Dialogue: Co-operation, Not Confrontation
Aware that the grand problems of the South cannot be tackled without a holistic approach, the
South recognises that it must engage in dialogue with the North. In a world of unrestricted
financial and trade flows, issues like economic development and growth can no longer be dealt
with in isolation (Mbeki, 2000e). The developing world thus is dependent on the co-operation of
the developed world. This is particularly true when it comes to the development issues of debt
relief, pharmaceuticals, and aid or technology transfers. Realising this interdependence, Mbeki
has made a major pillar of his tactics to use high profile meetings of Northern élites to lobby for
Africa's case, thus making the concerns and requests of the poor world heard.
"We must seek dialogue and partnership of the South and the North, which should encompass the
strengthening of intergovernmental cooperation, including the necessary coherence of policies of
multilateral institutions. Many international agreements, strenuously arrived at, constitute a sound
basis for strengthening such global partnerships for development." (Mbeki, 1999a)
Mbekis tactic relies on co-operation rather than confrontation, engaging the most powerful
countries in a dialogue and obtaining concessions in return, instead of resisting them as strategic
opponents as part of the South would prefer. He is often thus criticised for mingling too much
with the North and being a playball of the North. However, Mbeki does not seem to waste any
occasion to make a pledge for the South, remind the North of its responsibilities towards the
South, and stress the potential of working to create mutually beneficial economic growth. At the
EU-Africa Summit in Cairo in April 2000, Mbeki expressed the "need to establish a strategic
partnership" (Mbeki, 2000f) between the two regions. In Okinawa two months later, he, together
with other leaders of the South like Nigeria's Olegun Obasanjo, Algeria's Abdelaziz Bouteflika
11 The full text of the New Africa Initiative is available under http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/misc/mapomega.
html.
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and Thailand' representative, asked the G-8 to join the South in creating a partnership for a more
humane world. Other important meetings included the Nordic Summit held in May 2000; the EU
Summit held in Portugal in June 2000; and the Summit on Progressive Governance in June 2000
in Berlin. At many of these multilateral meetings, Mbeki was the sole representative of the
South, letting no opportunity go by to lobby for his case. In fact, Mbeki managed to advance
with time as "the primary Third World partner of choice for the developed world." (Fine, 2001:
9). Mbeki has developed even stronger relationships with several of the G-8 members,
particularly with Britain's Labour and Germany's Social Democrats, who are - at least formally -
allied with the ANC in the Socialist International.
5. CONCLUSION
The preceding assessment of the emergence, content, means and tactics of "Mbeki' s Global
Initiative" has shown that it is justified to call South Africa's global equity policy 'Mbeki-driven.'
Many of the ideas and positions which he is promoting were elements of the ANC's and
Pretoria's foreign policy stance. However, it has to be attributed to Thabo Mbeki that these
positions were revitalised after a time in which South Africa's enthusiasm to engage strongly in
international affairs had cooled down. Mbeki has to be merited for the implementation of many
of these ideas. It was he who put them high on the international agenda and thus managed to
rekindle the thinking about global equity issues.
The analysis of Mbeki's programme yields a fundamental inconsistency between vision and
objectives. Many of his concrete objectives have not completely invented the wheel anew, but
they do include 'traditional' concerns and problems of the South. With few exceptions they are
aimed at mitigating the negative effects accompanying the dominant global order and are will not
shake it at its fundamentals and ordering principles. Rather, his objectives move within the
boundaries of the unquestioned current global order. Progressive ideas of how to achieve his
proclaimed goals of global solidarity and the transformation of the world into a new world order
are nowhere to be found in his concept. Instead, Mbeki' s initiative underlines the South's
dependence on the goodwill of the North to bring about change. In fact, the thinking behind
Mbeki's new world order can be found within the framework of globalisation and its underlying
ideology of neo-liberalism, imposed through Northern hegemony. Content analysis reveals that
Mbeki's programme lacks the radicalism that his rhetoric suggests.
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Mbeki's strategy makes strong use of multilateral fora, both among the South and the North, as
means to promote his programme and win supporters. Such events are used to promote his ideas
and to mobilise developing countries to join him in pursuing them. His strategy in this way is
two-fold: to improve and increase both North-South and South-South dialogue. The rationale
behind the latter is to build a stronger Southern counterpart to the North. This approach of North-
South co-operation rests on his assumption of international dependence in a globalised world and
that the South will not be able to tackle their problems alone as most of them are 'international'
problems.
Having built the basis for the evaluation of the Mbeki Global Initiative the question which
logically follows from this "What" is the question" Why is he doing this?". What are the reasons
that are driving him to launch this ambitious international programme, and why is he doing it the
way he is doing it?
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Foreign Policy begins
where domestic policy ends.
Henry Kissinger
1. INTRODUCTION
When evaluating foreign policy it is essential to bear in mind that it is neither occuring nor
formulated in a vacuum;there is not one single and exclusively identifiable factor or sphere
which determines its nature. Rather, foreign policy is made in a contentious environment of
conflicting interests that are struggling for dominance. Furthermore, foreign policy making is
not a one-way-street, nurtured from one side and working in one direction. It is much more a
complex, ongoing process of swinging to and fro (Putnam, 1988).
As the head of state, Thabo Mbeki is one of the protagonists in South African foreign policy,
next to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Thus, what has been said
about the making of foreign policy must also apply to Mbeki's Global Initiative. The factors
which influence foreign policy making derive from different levels of political life. It is
generally accepted that three levels can be distinguished: the individual, the domestic and the
international level'. All three levels will be investigated in the following chapter, and thus the
variety of (likely) determinants ofMbeki's global approach will be shown.
Due to the restricted scope of this study, an assessment of which of these factors and levels
has the biggest impact and determines recent outcomes most cannot be made. The aim here
can only be to show the variety of factors which can be found in existing literature and to
bring order into the complexity of socio-politicallife.
Based on the assumption that foreign policy does not take place in a vacuum, this chapter will
try to find answers to the question why Thabo Mbeki is calling for global change in the form
of his "Global Initiative". It will first examine the individual level, that is, the person Thabo
Mbeki itself, his characteristics, views and perceptions.
1The Level of Analysis problem goes back to Kenneth Waltz and his Ph.D. thesis "Man, the State and War" of
1954. Waltz identified three different types of explanations of war. Following these fmdings, which were mainly
extended by Kaplan and Singer, the three levels mentioned are widely accepted today. On the level of analysis
problem in international relations, see Buzan, 1995: 203.
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2. THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL
2.1 A Policy for the Encyclopedia?
The presidency of Thabo Mbeki is guided by a different ethos than that of Nelson Mandela.
Whereas the Mandela presidency was dominated by the need for reconciliation and policy
development, so is Mbeki' s tenure confronted with the need to move beyond this - to proceed,
and succeed, in the area of policy implementation. (Mills, 1999: 13). As heir to South Africa's
first democratic president after apartheid, Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki is, however, not
only faced with implementing transformation and delivering political promises but also with
the difficult task of succeeding this widely respected icon whose personality has earned him
great popularity, both inside as well as outside the country. As a person differing in so many
ways from Mandela's politically and and socially outstanding personality, Thabo Mbeki is
confronted with finding his own way of obtaining respect and recognition. Considering South
Africa's domestic problems, which to a great extent are those typical for a developing
country, Thabo Mbeki's chances of deriving success from domestic politics are considerably
low, given the long-term nature of most of South Africa's internal problems and the fact that
expectations on investment-led growth have not materialised so far. The international scene
would in this regard constitute a welcome compensatory source for earning distinction and
recognition and building up a distinct image which goes further than just 'Mandela's
successor.' This contention that the gain of popularity and respect might be behind Mbeki's
international ambitions finds further support in the fact that President Mbeki cannot scoop
high popularity from inside his country.
However, there are voices arguing that "Mbekis approach (...) is not about personal self-
advancement" (Bond, 2000: 1). But what other factors can be brought forward on an
individual level analysis that could influence this global activism?
2.2 Thabo Mbeki and Transformation
According to Margaret Hermann, personal characteristics of high level policy makers can
affect foreign policy outcomes given certain circumstances. 'Personal characteristics' referrs to
variables such as biographical data, training, work experience, personality traits, beliefs and
attitudes, and values (Hermann, 1978: 64). The possibility and degree of such variables to
affect a state's foreign policy behaviour, however, is more relevant if the leader is a high level
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policy maker with a considerable influence in foreign policy than if he is little involved in
international affairs. In addition to this, the impact of a leader's characteristics depends on his
interest in foreign affairs, his diplomatic experience, and sensitivity to his environment
(Hermann, 1978: 49, 57). At least the former two can be said to apply with certainty in Thabo
Mbeki's case since he is, as South Africa's head of state, one of the main players in the
country's foreign policy making, next to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Mbeki was a leading
ANC representative in various countries, was one of the leading figures in the negotiations for
South Africa's political transformation in the early 1990s and was in charge of Pretoria's
foreign affairs under Mandela. Besides this, the condition applies that Mbeki' s degree of
influence is considerably high when it comes to South Africa's engagement for Africa and the
rest of the global South (Hermann, 1978: 53).
Applying Hermann's model to Thabo Mbeki, how can his personal characteristics be
influencing South Africa's foreign policy of promoting the interest of the South and
developing an equitable global system?
Thabo Mbeki has the image of being a thinker. He has become known as a politician who - in
contrast to the "reconciler" Nelson Mandela - is regarded as a "transformer" who prefers
making policy at the desk rather than in townships. Having been "born into the struggle", as
he is reported to have said once, and having joined the ANC Youth League at the age of 14,
his whole life has been circling around the fight against apartheid, racial injustice and
inequality.
In his character, Mbeki is portrayed as reserved, excelling in patience, and having proven
more than once his fine negotiating skills. When dealing with potential opponents, Mbeki is
said to try to listen to and understand the thinking and interests of the opposite side, trying to
co-opt, rather than confront the opponent, and he is seemingly obsessed with the "conviction
that peaceful negotiation [is] ... the only route to peace" (Hadland and Rantao, 1999: 65). His
dislike of confrontation sometimes goes so far that the Financial Mail once attributed him
with weakness. (Hadland and Rantao, 1999: 101). According to the descriptions of Hadland
and Rantao, who give an extensive view on the person of Thabo Mbeki, the negotiations with
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the ruling elite of South Africa before and during the country's political transformation of the
early 1990s give expression to Mbeki's moderate character:
"It was Thabo who first started meeting with Afrikaner intellectuals in the 1980s in a bid to
understand their fears and needs and it was Thabo who ensured the political parties representing the
Afrikaner were included in the 1994 election." (Hadland and Rantao, 1999: 143).
This diplomatic approach seems to be repeated in Mbeki's dealing with the G-7. As argued in
Chapter IIhis tactics are characterised by a co-operative rather than confrontative approach.
He is not opposing the powerful countries of the North, nor is he blaming them for the
deterioration of living conditions in poor countries', but he seems to try to elicit concessions
from them by convincing them of his case. Thus, there seems to be a parellel between Mbeki's
global approach and the way in which he approached the ruling elite of apartheid-South
Africa, when he was trying "to understand and perhaps even co-opt the Afrikaner elite in
exile" (Hadland and Rantao, 1999: 57).
In political terms, Mbeki is a rational pragmatic who prefers striving for the possible rather
than fighting a hopeless battle for the impossible. A politician who, according to the authors
of his biography "doesn't have a rabble-rouser approach to politics" (Hadland and Rantao,
1999: 105) but who has been known as "the voice of moderation within the ANC leadership"
(Hadland and Rantao, 1999: 86), contrary to some of his more radical ANC colleagues such
as Chris Hani.
This, however, does not seem to be the complete picture of Thabo Mbeki's character.
Whereas boosters call him mild, suave and diplomatic, more critical sources picture him as a
"manipulative and calculating" politician (in Nyatsumba, 1998: 36). Particularly "when it
comes to party politics, Mbeki has the reputation as a ruthless operator" (Schuler, 1999).
According to Tom Lodge, veteran analyst of the ANC, "the grooming for leadership by a
secretive, authoritarian organisation in exile helps to explain the manipulative style" of
Mbeki. "He works behind the scenes. He doesn't welcome opposition." (in Schuler, 1999)
Instead, he eliminates it. This was said to have been the case with his closest rival for the
Deputy Presidency under Mandela, labour leader Cyril Ramaphosa, and was possibly the
rationale behind the "highly doubtful" (Caromba, 2001) allegations of a plot against the
2 As Patrick Bond points out, Mbeki tries in no instance to draw the link between growing wealth in one part of
the world with deteriorating prospects in the other, poorer part (Bond, 2000: 8).
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president in late April 2001. The probe into the alleged plot, said the ANC, was to "serve as a
warning to potential opponents within the ANC to back down." (People's daily, 2001)
Mbeki's leadership style has found little admiration so far. Before South Africa's second
president after apartheid took office in Pretoria in 1999, political scientist Robert Schrire had
already predicted that Mbeki would surround himself with supporters and that his Cabinet
"will [thus] be chosen on loyalty rather than on competency," (in Schuler, 1999). The
accusation that his advisors are but "buddies" who avoid criticising the president but tell him
what he wants to hear (Eedes, 2001: 53) is one of the criticisms which South Africa's
president is regularly confronted with. Besides this, the Mail and Guardian warned in 1999
that "[ujnder Thabo Mbeki's leadership, we see an unashamed attempt by the African
National Congress to accumulate and centralise power." (in Schuler, 1999) This prediction
received a considerable degree of support in early 2001 with Frank Chikane's Report on the
plans to restructure the Presidency'. The reform outlined in the report is said to make foreign
policy making more effective in order to support "South Africa's vision of a better life for all
at home, alongside a better world for all on the continent and beyond". "The Presidency' ,"
says the report,
"has a bold promotional role to play in this area because effective international co-operation directly
impacts on political, economic, scientific and technological developments here at home. Well-
managed international relations are a vital ingredient in the mix that makes for peace, security and
domestic prosperity." (Democratic Governance, 2001: 19-20).
"Because beliefs and motives suggest ways of interpreting the environment, the political
leader is likely to urge his government to act in ways consistent with such images."
(Hermann: 1978: 61) So what are Mbeki's views and assumptions about the global political
economy? How does he perceive globalisation and its underlying neo-liberalist paradigm?
On the international scene, Mbeki' s actions seem to a great extent determined by his
acceptance of the existing global economic framework which - as was indicated in the
previous chapter - he does not aim to radically change, despite his pleas of the need for a new
economic world order. In fact, a great part of his rhetoric gives little indication that he is
questioning globalisation and together with it the neo-liberal ideology. On the contrary,
despite some critical comments about the negative impacts of globalisation within and among
3 Democratic Governance - a restructured Presidency at work 2000/2001, March 2001, available at http:// www.
gov.za/reports/200 lIpresidencyO l.pdf (October 15, 2001).
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countries, Thabo Mbeki accepts this phenomenon as an irreversable process which can only
be adjusted but cannot be opposed entirely. He asserts that developing countries ought to
engage more in this process since it
"has brought about many possibilities for rapid advancement of humanity, for poor and underveloped
countries to take advantage of this process to take a quantum leap and close the huge technological
and economic gap .... In other words, the world and particularly developing countries have an
opportunity to advance faster than would have been the case previously." (Mbeki, 2000b)
Hence, in Mbekis view, the challenge is not to find alternatives to globalisation, and "the
choice for countries of the South is not whether to engage with globalisation or not, but how
to engage with it." (Mbeki, 2001). In this way, Mbeki seems to be in line with Mandela, who
ascribed negative effects only to aspects of globalisation, not the paradigm itself (Mandela, in
Bond, 2001: 86). One of the negative side-effects of globalisation, the loss of national
sovereignty, features relatively often in Mbeki's speeches, but while he requests heads of
states to address this issue, he regards it as "foolish to try to resist globalisation". (Nel, 1999:
22).
As an essential pre-condition for economic growth, Mbeki believes strongly in the necessity
of adopting neo-liberal economic policies. In doing this, he is denying the country the
capacity to develop endogeneously in a globalised world:
"...the very fact of the process of globalisation, in all its forms, means that our own success as
developing countries in terms of the upliftment of our peoples cannot be achieved in conditions of
autarchy or self-contained development within our national boundaries or regions." (Mbeki, 1998)
This view receives expression in Mbeki's appreciation of the US African Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGO A), whose approach confirms and re-affirms the dependence of a
country like South Africa on one of the constituting countries of the neo-liberal paradigm,
even though on a different occasion he concedes that the more developing countries become
integrated into the global market, the more they become dependent on the global economy to
end their poverty (Mbeki, 2000g).
Commenting on GEAR, Pretoria's domestic econormc policy strategy reacting to the
dominant global paradigm of neo-liberalism and. as such adhering to the wisdom of the
Washington Consensus, South Africa's then Deputy President Mbeki expressed in 1997 that
there were no alternatives to a policy of this liberal kind and that "Anyone who is rational
can't come to any conclusion other than our (economic) policies" (Financial Mail, 3 October
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1997, in Marais, 1998: 161t· Indicative of Mbeki's outlook is his belief that developing
countries are caught in a globalised world that is "an objective outcome of the development of
the productive forces that create wealth, including their continuous improvement and
expansion through the impact on them of advances in science, technology and engineering"
(Mbeki, 2000c).
To sum up this point about the impact of Thabo Mbeki's leadership style, his views and
beliefs about globalisation, and other personal traits, it has been argued here that in the case of
his "Global Initiative", his personal characteristics can help in explaining both the strategy
and style of Pretoria's foreign policy (Hermann, 1978: 60-61). Further, it has been argued that
his approach to developing an equitable global system remains within the framework of neo-
realism and globalisation, because Mbeki is convinced that this process is irreversable and
that developing countries can benefit from engaging in it. The absence of radical
characteristics in the programme reflects one part of his character of being moderate and
pragmatic.
The political motives of leaders are another force which affects their policies. The following
section will focus on whether this is an important rationale behind Mbeki' s foreign policy.
3. DOMESTIC CHALLENGES: CONTENDING FORCES IN SOUTH AFRICA'S POST-ApARTHEID
SOCIETY
Recent political theory acknowledges that the state is more than a black box or a unitary actor
and that domestic political processes must be taken into consideration when trying to
understand and interprete the foreign policy behaviour of a state. Understood as behaviour of
its bureaucracy, "State behaviour reflects societal concerns and cleavages more than it does a
calculation of 'abstract' state interests. Thus, to the extend that a state acts as a single actor,
the interest of this actor depends on the mix of societal interests that it is supposed to
'honestly broker'" (Nel, et al. 2001: 15).
Pretoria's foreign policy has frequently been an object of criticism. Foreign policy has been
criticised most for lacking consistency and coherence. This can to some extent be attributed to
4 In fact, Mbeki's view is influenced by the success of the ASEAN countries, whose economic success he sees as
an example for South Africa (Mbeki, 1996b). Itmust be mentioned here, however, that the Asian Tiger's model
for success cannot easily be transferred to South Africa, which is confronted with a completely different
geographical, national and international situation from Asia (Marais, 1998: 131).
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another point of criticism, namely that Pretoria's foreign policy was lacking a clearly defined
direction, but, as has been shown in recent literature, it faces the challenge of steering the
multiplicity of contending social forces in South Africa's society into policy.
In the following, evidence will be provided for the argument that domestic forces and
constraints are influencing Thabo Mbeki in pursuing a global equity programme, and the
contending domestic forces in South Africa's society and the pressures and constraints for
policy making which result from this shall be pointed out. The policy shift from RDP to
GEAR will be investigated, as will the factors of corporatism and tripartism in South African
policy making.
3.1 Victory of Neo-liberalism: GEAR instead of RDP
Thabo Mbeki has frequently been criticised for spending too much of his time outside the
country, far from his constituency, discussing rather abstract 'global matters' with the
international élite instead of being present at home where needs are most pressing. As shown
in the previous section, not only do popular politics not fit his personality, but another
determinant of this behaviour is his assumptions about globalisation and the global economy
and, directly related to this, his views on how to achieve economic development and growth
in an interdependent world which, on one occasion in 1996, made him call himself a
"Thatcherite' (Business Times, June 16, 1996).
Based on Mbeki's assumptions and views,' the much-discussed GEAR was adopted in 1996
and promoted as supporting the economic goals expressed in the RDP according to official
interpretations. In fact, it is based on a completely different wisdom of how to achieve growth
and raise welfare levels, thus introducing a diametrically opposing economic strategy to the
RDP6.This radical policy shift, from a strategy of redistribution, working bottom-up, to a neo-
liberal approach based on trickle-down logic, come as a surprise to many - since the new
programme was introduced in a rush, having been developed in an exclusive circle of high-
sit is not contended here, that South Africa 's neo-liberal economic policies rest solely on Thabo Mbeki's view
on globalisation and the global political economy, and that other persons were not contributing to the adoption of
GEAR and supporting his views.
6 GEAR represented official World Bank and IMF economic wisdom and was formulated by economists of the
Finance Ministry, the Development Bank of Southern Africa, the World Bank and the Bureau of Economic
Research of the University of Stellenbosch (Bond, in Taylor 2000: 176).
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profile ANC officials, without consulting allied forces (Taylor, 2000: 175V The change in
policy evoked loud criticism from both outside and inside the ANC and the other parts of the
alliance. Despite including redistribution in its name, GEAR had only very little relation to its
predecessor, RDP, and despite arguments that it constituted just another way of realising the
goal of redistribution, the term itself was only referred to four times in the document. Instead,
GEAR bowed to 'common sense orthodoxy', serving the interests of capital at the expense of
labour - symbolic of the dominant paradigm of the current new world order and the ANC
élite's acceptance of this.
The reasons as to why GEAR was introduced in this way can be found by taking a closer look
at the constellation of interests in different parts of South Africa's society, the constraints they
pose on policy making, and particularly the clash of dominant interests from the left with the
views of high-profile policy makers. Among the latter is Thabo Mbeki, who, without doubt,
has been one of the masterminds behind many of South Africa's policies, including the
country's economic policy.
3.2 Of Corporatism and Tripartism
The achievement of liberation in the early 1990s left South Africa with a fragmented variety
of political and economic views and opinions. Not only did the divide between the
"internationalists", who favoured an ethical foreign policy, and the less idealistic "neo-
mercantilists", supported by big business and conservative thinkers, make a clear and
consistent foreign policy difficult, but there were also ideological clashes on the question of
what internal economic strategy to pursue in order to reduce poverty and bring the country's
economy back on the growth track.
In this political environment, one of the greatest challenges for the Government of National
Unity between political elites of the ANC and the National Party certainly was to bring
everybody on board by creating consensual harmony among the agonistic interests of key
stakeholders (Marais, 1998: 147). With the ANC gradually finding an official economic
stance, shifting from a more leftist interpretation of its economically rather neutral Freedom
71t is agreed here with Marais (1998: 193) that GEAR did not so much reflect a shift in political economic
thinking but rather a shift from ideological to technocratic forms of policy making. It is not new that the
movement promotes the interest of capital. "During the liberation struggle, particularly before 1960, [the ANC]
articulated an ideology favourable to the development of the Black capitalist class." (Mail and Guardian, May
21-27, 1999)
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Charter via the commitment to a mixed economy in the 1988 Constitutional Guidelines
(Marais, 1998: 147), to a more capitalistic one in the early 1990s, the adoption of a neo-liberal
tinted programme for economic recovery by the GNU was always going to provoke the
dissent of a large part of the society. Particularly labour, represented by the Congress of South
African Trade Unions (COSA TU), had opposing views about a new South African
macroeconomic policy. This posed to the government the threat of 'political instability. In
addition to this, COSATU requested greater influence on economic policy making and
suggested a National Economic Forum (NEF) which combined capital, state and labour in a
tripartite forum. In its attempt to harmonise this complex suite of political considerations the
GNU adopted a corporatist model of dealing with contending societal interests as "the most
feasible response for state elites intent on neutralising a potential opposition while
simultaneously retaining a sense of political stability." (Habib, in Van der Westhuizen, 1998:
443).
Apart from a corporatist organisation of economic policy making in South Africa, labour is
incorported into policy-making through the model of a tripartite alliance between the ANC,
the South African Communist Party (SAPC) and COSATU. The relations among the three go
back to pre-transformation times and were formalised in 1990.
The establishment of a tripartite alliance played an important role during South Africa's
process of transformation. The inclusive policy making strategy of the alliance of the three
organisations, whose memberships partly overlap, played a significant role: it helped to
streamline a wide spectrum of societal forces and contributed to social stabilisation
(Barchiesi, 1999: 21).
But despite the institutional link of the organisations, there are different camps prevalent in
the alliance, and these camps regularly clash over politico-economic issues, particularly the
question of what macroeconomic policies to adopt to achieve the common goal, the socio-
economic upliftment of the majority of the population. This profound discrepancy has been
threatening the continuance of the alliance. While the ANC in 1994 still supported the
COSATU initiated RDp8 which "seemed to accomodate the divergent interests of contesting
social and economic forces" (Marais, 1998: 183), particularly as South Africa was heading
towards elections, the ANC has since then, in a dominant act of its more capitalist wing,
8 Itmust be mentioned here, however, that the RDP then "had been pruned of most of its earlier, radical
outgrowths" (Marais, 1998: 185), and included liberal elements. '
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gradually distanced itself from accomodating many of COSATU's concerns, leading to a
"rising subordination of COSATU [and SACP] to the ANC in the alliance context"
(Barchiesi, 1999: 29). This culminated eventually in the replacement of the RDP by GEAR.
This switch to 'common sense' economic policies, however, not only ignored COSATU and
SACP, but also more leftist forces within the ANC, which itself does not speak with one single
voice but is an aggregate of diverse ideological views. GEAR was the decision of an
exclusive circle of ANC elites, including Thabo Mbeki, who seemed convinced that
"Proceeding from the objective reality of the place and role of private capital ... which
exists independent of our subjective wishes, the correct strategic decision the democratic
movement must take is that the democratic state must establish a dialectical relationship
with private capital as a social partner for developmental progress ...This is meant to
describe a complex, contradictory, co-operative and dynamic relationship, many of whose
elements are formed or decided at the international level. What is certain is that there is a
need for co-existence and co-operation between the democratic state and private capital in
order to address social development.... (ANC discussion document 1996, in Barchiesi,
1999: 26-27)
With the adoption of GEAR, capital had achieved a victory over labour and has since then
prevailed in Pretoria's macro-economic strategy. "However, the shift to 'neo-liberalism' was
in this case, compared to other African countries, less dependent on economic crisis and the
constraints imposed by international financial institutions, and more a matter of contestation
over strategic choices between labour, state and capita1." (Barchiesi, 1999: 21)
The unsatisfied leftist wing within the ANC and entire alliance had to be accomodated in their
concerns and interests for the sake of social peace and political strategic reasons, as well.
However, as Howard Barrell notes, "No ruling party, especially one who makes revolutionary
claims, can equally serve two contending classes." (Barrell, 2000b)
As an example of foreign policy as continuation of domestic policy, Mbekis Global Initiative
thus serves well as a lightning conductor for those societal forces whose interests are not
served in domestic politics but have to be accomodated equally by him. By adopting a foreign
policy stance sympathetic to the part of societal interests which were not addressed in
domestic politics, Mbeki, as much as the GNU, "becomes able to convince its domestic allies
to the Left that it has not caved in to the pressures of the global neo-liberal agenda" (Nel,
1999: 23), even if this is, as Taylor adds, what has actually happened. (2000: 14). It is a
strategy of "play[ing] to two audiences at the same time, with different sets of expectations"
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(Nel, 1999: 23), capital with a market-friendly macro-economic policy and mitigating labour
with the pursuance of their interests on the international level.
4. THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL: SOUTH AFRICA'S ROLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
Having investigated the domestic and individual level of analysis, it is now asked in what way
the system could encourage - or even request? - South Africa's president to raise his voice so
strongly for the South and engage in dialogue about greater global equity with the North. Why
is the North, represented best by the G-7, the group of world's leading countries, becoming so
increasingly welcoming to Mbekis propositions of greater global solidarity? Is the G-7
suddenly caught by a wave of morality or converted by the influence of Blair and Schroder to
institutionalise a global "third way"? Or are Mbeki and his ideas perhaps just a welcome deus
ex machina for the G-7 to soothe the protesting masses?
Before dealing in more detail with these questions, the following section outlines how the
country Thabo Mbeki is heading is positioned in the international system and how this affects
Mbeki's potential to emerge as leader of the South and promote his reformist ideas.
4.1 South Africa as a Country Inbetween - an Emerging" Middle Power
4.1.1South Africa's Qualifications as a Middle Power
The fact that South Africa shows features of a developed as well of a developing country, and
that it is member both of North and South-based organisations, enables it "to understand, and
relate to, the concerns of both the South, as well as the North", (Nzo, 1996). What at first
sight looks like the misfortune of sitting between two chairs, not really belonging to either of
the two worlds, affords the opportunity to take on a mediating and bridge-building role
between the two poles - an ideal position for negotiating international compromises
(Breytenbach, 1995: 232).
This semiperipheral position South Africa occupies m the world system constitutes a
necessary, but not a sufficient, condition to argue that South Africa is an emerging middle
power and gives Mbeki a specific scope for action. In the understanding of Robert Cox "...the
term 'middle power' points to a position within the broad or universal state system, based on
9 As opposed to "traditional" middle powers, "emerging" middle powers are part of the developing world.
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an assumption that there is some hierarchical order of states, no matter the theoretical notion
of the idea of anarchy and the equality of all states." (Schoeman, 2000: 48).
But Pretoria confirms with her foreign policy practice the contention that the country is
indeed a middle power. Not only has the ex-pariah state manifested its commitment to
international co-operation by (re- )joining a variety of international organisations and signing
diverse multilateral treaties" as well as taking over chairmanship positions of several
multilateral organisations such as UNCTAD from 1996 to 1999, the Non-Aligned Movement
from 1998 until the end of 2001 and the Commonwealth from 1999 to 2002. It has also on
several occasions shown the typical characteristic of a middle power of supporting the
prevalent order instead of questioning the existing organising principles of intemational life."
Cox explains this with the contention that middle powers have an "interest in a stable and
orderly environment" (Schoeman, 2000: 48). They seek a rules-based international system
which provides them with a stable framework in which they can exert a reasonable amount of
influence, and which prevents them from unilateral actions from dominant powers by binding
these into this framework of coordinated behaviour. International institutions provide this
framework. "Because ... a middle power ... cannot impose its own vision of such an ideal
world in the presence of big superpowers, it would choose, almost logically, to exert influence
at the multilateral level where it can build consensus around certain issues." (Schoeman,
2000: 48). Chairing multilateral organisations of the South, such as UNCTADor NAM, is a
/
powerful means of exerting influence in this regard.
The scope of a middle power to exert influence on a global level, however, is limited. Middle
powers as powers in the intermediary of the hierachical structure of the international system
do not possess the necessary power to dominate, which in tum binds them to accept the
prevailing order. This non-revolutionarism is a significant characteristic of South Africa's
foreign policy behaviour. Being incorporated into the global division of labour, there are no
chances to opt out of this structure. This leaves a middle power like South Africa with only
the chance to try and modify this structure to their best advantage (Nel, et al., 2000b: 46).
10 For a comprehensive overview of South Africa's re-activated multilateral history since 1994, see Nel, et al.,
2001: 126-132.
II In this way, as Nel et al. show, legitimising the existing order. The case of South Africa's support for the US
proposal in the 1995 negotiations about the review and extension of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty of
1970 is probably the most outstanding case in point here. See Nel, et al., 2000: 46-47, 49-51).
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The connection between middlepowermanship and the use of multilateral organisations is
important in understanding Mbeki's activism in global politics. Mark Neufeld explains that
"middlemanpowership direct[s} the ... state to playa prominent role in multilateral fora ... In
this way, the notion of 'middle power' orient[ates] the ... state to a role supportive of the
hegemonic global order ... [and] ... by fulfilling an important role of facilitater and mediator,
[the middle power] help[s] defuse potential conflicts which, if not addressed, might ...
undermine the stability of the global order." (emphasis added) (Neufeld, in Taylor, 2001: 69)
Looking at Thabo Mbeki' s role from this systemic perspective, it can be argued that the
system is another important variable which influences Mbekis approach with it, not only
making it possible for him to pursue the role as negotiator between the North and the South,
but virtually pushing him into this role.
Connected with this new middle power position that South Africa occupies In the
international system after the democratic change of 1994 are a series of expectations from
outside which are likely to have encouraged Thabo Mbeki.
4.1.2 Expectationsfrom the North
South Africa's transition to democracy and re-integration into the international community in
1994 not only meant a number of new foreign policy options but also triggered high
expectations from outside for the country and its role in the international system. While on an
official visit in South Africa, Warren Christopher expressed such expectations with his
remark that there were "few countries with greater potential to help shape the 21st century
than the new South Africa." (Christopher, in Schoeman 2000: 50) This has certainly also
opened space for Thabo Mbeki to launch his Global Initiative (Arnold, 2000: 159-161).
But it is not only that powerful countries imposed a degree of expectations on South Africa.
More recently, the North seems to be opening up to the concerns and interests of the South.
On several occasions the G-7 invited leaders of pivotal South countries to their global
summits, and in particular "SA's president has, in a nutshell, become the primary Third World
partner of choice for the developed world." (Fine, 2001: 9) It was Thabo Mbeki who was
regularly given the space to present the view from the South. Already in 1995 Mbeki was
asked to speak on the occasion of the G-7 Conference on the Information Society in Belgium.
He spoke again at the Berlin Conference on Progressive Governance in June 2000 and
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represented the South at the Nordic Summit in Denmark in May of the same year, as well as
at the Summit of the European Union, held in Portugal, one month later. In addition to this, he
made his case next to Nigeria's Olegun Obasanjo and Algeria's Abdelaziz Bouteflika at the
Okinawa Summit of the G-8, and at the recent economic summit of world leaders in Genoa in
July 2001, he and other African leaders lobbied for Northern support for the New Africa
Initiative.
Are these developments grounds for the assumption that the North is indeed committed to
structural change and thus interested in Mbekis propositions? Several reasons could be
underlying this new trend in global politics that spurs Mbeki in his engagement.
4.2 Time for Change: Commitment or Hypocrisy?
There is actually a number of arguments on the basis of which the positive responses towards
recent developing world initiatives by the North could be seen as honest and, indeed,
committed to greater co-operation with the South.
The first argument is that there is growing realisation that the North's future well-being is
inextricably connected with the fate of the South. Co-operation with the developing world
would thus be beneficial to the North, as Mbeki asserts. A second factor that could have
triggered the developed world to engage in dialogue with the marginalised countries is the
growing resistance to globalisation and thus to the policies of the most powerful countries. In
this case, Thabo Mbekis ideas and ambitions would just be the deus ex machina for the G-7.
Opening their exclusive circle to some prominent members of the South would represent a
means to soothe a resistant mass and show that critiques of the North's global dominance are
not justified. Letting Mbeki and his colleagues talk can only send mitigating signals; it does
not necessarily mean that the North will answer with action. Another possible argument could
be - and there are some indications for this - that there is a general global rethink, with impact
on the G-7, which moves from the promotion of a Washington to a post-Washington
Consensus.
So is there indeed a "turing point in defining new relations between the south and the north"
visible, as proclaimed by Bheki Khumalo, presidential spokesman? (2001 :7) The apparently
new trend in the North of showing openness for the concerns of the marginalised world does
not necessarily mean that a new era of global co-operation is on its way. It might be just
48
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER III
Personal Views, Domestic Constraints and International Expectations
another example of Northern hypocracy. The following chapter will investigate this in more
depth by taking a closer look at the happenings and outcomes of the latest G-7 in Genoa in
July 2001.
5. CONCLUSION
The aim of this chapter has been to give a comprehensive overview of the factors influencing
Thabo Mbeki in his efforts to engage the powerful nations of the world in the upliftment of
the South, and in particular Africa. In order to bring structure into the complex web of
influencing variables, the explanations found in the literature have been ordered around
Waltz' three levels of analysis. The result of the literature review is that explanations for
Mbeki's international engagement can be found in his personal characteristics, that is on the
individual level, in South Africa's domestic political environment, the national level, as well
as on the structural level in South Africa's role and standing in the international system.
Looking at the way Thabo Mbeki is currently portrayed in biographic literature as well as in
the media leads one to conclude that some part of the answer to the "why" asked in this
chapter is to be found in his leadership style, his personal attributes. Mbeki has committed a
great part of his life to the achievement of political transformation in South Africa and the
realisation of human rights and equality among its population. Now that this goal has, at least
formally, been achieved, the new challenge is to continue the South African revolution on a
global scale (Bond, 2000: 1). But despite his fight for change, various examples show that
South Africa's second democratically elected president has never been a rebel or
revolutionary. This is reflected in the strategy of his approach, which adopts a co-operative
rather than a confrontative style, aiming at the best possible outcome instead of opting for all
or nothing.
Investigating comments made by him on the issue of globalisation reveals that Mbeki sees
this process as something unavoidable, something which cannot be changed but whose
potentials have to be exploited better by developing countries. The latter must therefore try to
integrate themselves into the global economy as an essential pre-requisite for ending their
global marginalisation. Hence, his programme stays within the ideological framework of the
current order and does not even attempt to overcome the underpinnings of the current order.
This neo-liberal character of his programme might reflect solely his thinking about the global
political economy. It might, however, also be a strategy by him to eliminate the opposing
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voices from COSATU and the rest of South Africa's political left - a trait which is frequently
attributed to him by less favourable voices and which might have been the rational behind the
announced allegations of a plot against him. That Mbeki is in favour of central policy-making
prove the plans to restructure the presidential office.
Academic research that takes South Africa's state-societal complex into consideration when
interpreting the country's foreign policy behaviour suggests, in addition to the factors
discussed above, that there is a concrete link between current South African foreign policy
and "the contradictions and concessions that sprang from the historic compromise" (Taylor,
2001: 7). South African politics incorporates both a corporatist and a tripartist element. Both
constructs bring together a wide spectrum of interests: in the case of corporatism, the state,
labour and business, and in the case of the tripartist alliance, the ANC with the SACP and
COSATU. Both can be said to be constructs which were critical in harmonising the vast array
of fragmented interests in the country's society and thus ensuring a smooth political
transformation. The adoption of a corporatist model in particular has been ascribed the
attribute of having been a 'crisis response', a political answer to prevent instability from
arising between two antagonistic forces, labour and capital, during the hot phase of South
Africa's transformation. The tripartite bond between ANC, SACP and COSATU, on the other
hand, goes back to apartheid times in which the three organisations strongly co-operated,
partly with overlapping memberships.
With labour and capital being integrated elements of South African policy making,
government is confronted with the dilemma of having to serve two masters. Confronted with
the need to formulate an economic position after having been an exclusively political
movement, the ANC, South Africa's ruling party from 1994, gradually adopted a business-
friendly approach as its macro-economic position. This trend culminated in and is best
exemplified by the switch from the RDP to GEAR, which was strongly supported by Thabo
Mbeki but vehemently disapproved by party-members and alliance partners. The switch from
RDP to GEAR equalled a victory of capital over labour, leaving labour's demands greatly
ignored. It is here where the connection between domestic and foreign policy comes in. Under
pressure to accomodate labour and to prove that government has not bowed completely to the
diametrically opposed interest of business, Thabo Mbeki looks across the border. There, in
talks with the global élite, he takes on a seemingly different approach than at home, criticising
the current global order that puts the majority of countries at great disadvantage and fighting
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for the concerns of the poor. By the way that the global arena serves as a lightning conductor
for those societal forces which are left unadressed in domestic politics, it has been shown that,
in the case of Mbeki's Global Initiative, Henry Kissinger's statement that foreign policy
begins where domestic policy ends, does indeed apply.
The final sphere of observation, the system, opens another source of explanation for Mbeki's
global activism. Analysis of the literature on South Africa's new role in the international
system draws the conclusion that the international system is relatively conducive to Mbeki's
ambitions. In fact, it is shown that the system not only opens space for him to take on the role
of the mediator between the North and the South but that it seems to virtually encourage him
to help shape the new century. However, this space is not indefinite, but rather it is limited by
the interests of the dominant power, the United States, together with her partners in the G-7,
who maintain a higher position in the hierarchically structured system of states. In this
system, South Africa takes on the position of a middle power of the South.
Increasingly, there are global developments and trends that lead one to believe that the time is
conducive to such change and that Mbekis efforts may well be rewarded. The developments
at the recent summit of the world leading countries in Genoa are the best example of this. In
the following chapter, the potential for change, looked at from a systemic perspective, will be
investigated further.
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The New World Order is nothing more than
a continuation of the old order whereby
the developed countries set the agenda and
determine the nature of multilateral relations.
Fantu Cheru'
1. INTRODUCTION
The end of bipolarity, which for a moment appeared to open the doors for a more democratic
and polycentric world, has not brought about a more just and equal global order. "Instead of
the announced development in the direction of the building of a multipolar world, we are now
faced with the process of unipolarity" (Mitrovic, 1999: 4), strengthened by an "unprecedented
co-operation among the advanced countries in maintaining the 'new world order'''.(Steven,
1994: 292).
Since then, a series of new developments have taken place which might be interpreted at first
sight as indications for coming change. One of the most recent cases in point is the Summit of
the G-8 in Genoa in July 2001, at which the leaders of the North opened their exclusive circle
and invited yet again a number of leaders from Africa and the developing world after the
example of the G-8 summit in Okinawa, where Mbeki and others made a plea for debt relief
for developing countries. In Okinawa, the leaders of the world's seven richest countries plus
Russia re-affirmed the plan, developed in 1999 at their summit in Cologne, to give Mbeki and
his Southern colleagues seats at the annual summit of the G-8 from the following year on,
thus turning the club into a G-20. In view of such measures, the question arises whether the
chances for a more democratic and equitable global order are indeed so far away.
The following part of this study is linked to the preceding chapter with respect to the global
economic order and the role and power South Africa holds within it. Whereas the last section
of the previous chapter concentrated on the space this international system is opening for
Mbeki to advance as the voice of the South, the following will take a closer look at the system
and the distribution of power in it, and will discuss the current chances for reaching a more
1 Cheru, 1997: 207.
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equal international order. Is it of any use that Mbeki spends so much effort and time overseas
trying to unite the South and to convince the North of Africa's commitment to improve
political conditions and the necessity to place hope in the continent? Some of Mbeki's critics
argue that, instead of "stirring Africa and saving the world", he should rather concentrate on
South Africa and its domestic problems. (Barrell, 2000c; Fine, 2000: 7). Besides this, will
Mbeki's global activism eventually make a difference to those that it is said to be aimed at, the
poor and all those whose livelihoods are becoming more and more insecure as a result of the
forces of an ever-more globalised world?
The following evaluation will argue that there will be no far-reaching change as a
consequence of the actions so far taken by the developing world, with Mbeki at the forefront.
The power to effect change is in the hands of the North, and it is firstly not intheir interest to
make effusive concessions to the South, and secondly Mbeki and his peers are actually not
asking for substantial change. It is quite likely that there will be some "minor tinkering"
(Bond, 2000: 7) on the working of global governance, particularly after the summit in Genoa,
which made the North realise more than ever that there has to be some sort of change with
regard to global governance. It is argued here that the North is indeed realising that their
undemocratic unipolar project cannot be continued as practised for the past years, whether out
of moral sentiment, self-interest or as a consequence of pressure from society. After all,
reform is in the interest of the G-8. Instead of achieving sustainable help for the continent and
its people, however, Mbeki and his colleagues will help to strengthen exactly the system
which works against their proclaimed goal of effecting the upliftment of Africa's population.
Instead, it merely benefits a minority élitistclass ..
After clarifying where Thabo Mbeki finds himself in the international power system as
president of a 'middle power', actions, re-actions and outcomes during and after the Genoa
summit of July 2001 will be investigated in order to test whether the recent signs coming from
the G-8 must indeed raise the expectations of global change.
2. POWER IN WORLD POLITICS: THE LIMITATIONS OF A MIDDLE POWER
As explained in chapter III South Africa's standing in the international system is characterised
by a middle position, based on its power relative to other nations. This means on the one hand
that it has the power to exert a reasonable degree of influence on other states, particularly
those which have a lower position in the power hierarchy. This is largely visible in South
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Africa's role in Africa, especially in the Southern African region where it acts as a regional
power'. Situated in a region of relatively weak peripheral states, this semi-peripheral country
is a leader in the region, both politically and economically (See Ahwireng-Obeng and
McGowan, 1998; Shoeman, 2000: 53-55). This means that a middle power like South Africa
"possesses more agency than a small and invariably vulnerable state in the pursuance of its
foreign policy, ..... [on the other hand, however, it] lacks the structural position to dominate."
(Taylor, 2000: 66). A middle power position implies being subordinate to a stronger power
which can exert a greater degree of influence, not merely regionally, but on a more global
scale. Thus, whereas South Africa holds a position at the top of the hierarchy of developing
countries, making it one of the leading countries of the periphery, it is incorporated into a
wider system of global power in which it is subordinate, with regard to economic and political
power, to the economically more advanced and wealthy countries of the North, and in
particular the G-8. It is this relatively small alliance of powerful countries that has a dominant
voice in virtually all organisations of global governance. In fact it is they who have been
shaping the global economy to what it has become at the present. These power discrepancies
between the G-8 and the less developed world are symbolised by 'allowing' the African
delegation to speak in front of the G-8 in Genoa. Mbeki and his colleagues appear little more
than petitioners.
It thus becomes evident that it is not in the hands of a middle power to change the existing
global order. lts own aspirations for change are limited to this order and can only take place
within this. In an order of this type, Thabo Mbeki's aim to engage in shaping a new world
according to his ideas of equity has, without the support of the dominant power(s), little
chance to succeed. As Breytenbach summarises it, "the rule-making monopoly still lies in the
North, while the South can only try to influence the rules as well as their application."
(emphasis added) (Breytenbach, 1995: 231). Any systemic evaluation as to how far Mbeki
can succeed with his ideas must hence investigate closely the thinking and strategy of the
North.
2 This regional power position is specific to Southern regional powers. It does not apply to Northern middle
powers (Schoeman, 2000: 48).
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3. GLOBAL RE-THINK
If one investigates the topics of international meetings in which the future paths of the global
economy are discussed, such as the annual World Economic Forum (WEF) or the summits of
the G-7 and G-8, one can observe the trend for recent events increasingly to include on their
agenda discussions on the reasonability and future of the Washington Consensus principles
and the tackling of global imbalances. The WEF meeting in 1999 was interpreted by Hein
Marais "as a kind of wake for the neo-liberal consensus, since "For the first time, Davos ...
failed to maintain its air of stately calm and studied indifference to a world ... 'of greater
income inequality than ever before in history'" (Marais, 1999). In June 2000, social
democratic presidents and heads of state, with third way protagonists Bill Clinton, Tony Blair
and Gerhard Schroder at their head, dedicated a meeting for the second time to discuss the
consequences of the changes in the global economy and how to "modem govern in the 21st
century." The final document of the meeting, in which, in addition to some Latin American
countries' presidents, Thabo Mbeki took part, "rediscovered the primacy of politics", as Die
Welt put it (Inacker, 2000: 3), and contained the agreement to fight poverty - even though this
remained without any concrete promise - and to combine market economy with social
responsibility so that "globalisation leads to an improvement of living standards for all instead
of representing a destructive downward spiral" (own translation) (Inacker, 2000: 3). A new
international social pact was needed to ensure that, as the leaders concluded "prosperity and
chances are spread widely and sustainably between countries" (own translation) (Piper, 2000:
4).
Shortly afterwards, the G-8 summit in Okinawa made the debt problem of poor countries one
of the central issues. The World Economic Forum (2001) gave attention to the backlash
against globalisation and the overcoming of the gap between globalisation winners and losers.
More and more, as well, there are voices questioning the conventional way of dealing with the
current problems of the global economy. Even inside multilateral organisations there appear
questions as to whether the current domination of neo-liberalism in the global economy
should be continued. World Bank senior vice president and chief economist Joseph Stiglitz,
for example, condemned the Washington Consensus in a speech in Helsinki, Finland, on
January 7, 1998
55
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER IV
A Chance for Global Equity?
and called for an end to misguided policies from Washington. There, he gave expression to
his conviction that
"'the set of policies which underlay the Washington Consensus are neither necessary nor sufficient,
either for macro-stability or longer-term development.' They are 'sometimes misguided', 'neglect ..
fundamental issues', are 'sometimes even misleading, and do 'not even address ... vital questions' ....
Russia followed the Washington Consensus line while China did not, ... and 'real incomes and
consumption have fallen in the former Soviet empire, and real incomes and consumption have risen
remarkably rapidly in China. 'The Washington Consensus only sought to achieve increases in
measured GDP, whereas 'we seek increases in living standards including improved health and
education .... We seek equitable development which ensures that all groups in society enjoy the fruits
of development, not just the few at the top. And we seek democratic development'." (Jubilee 2000,
1998)
At the World Economic Forum in January 1999, Stiglitz became more concrete, suggesting
that "If car after car runs off the road at the same road ... maybe its time to redesign the road"
(Stiglitz, in Marais, 1999). He is supported by the president of the World Bank, James
Wolfensohn, who has been questioning the currently predominant path taken toward
achieving development (Wolfensohn, -2000).
New voices are continuously joining the debates about a post-Washington Consensus. The
Economist is nowadays taking up the debate on inequality and asking questions about
distributional justice, because, as it argues, a backlash of the less-advantaged could vent itself
in eventually harming the better-off (The Economist, 2001 a: 11).
But how are such new tones and thinking on globalisation, global inequality and the way
forward in the global political economy to be interpreted? Does this really mean that there are
now better strategic opportunities for developing countries to contest the unfair international
regime, as Marais interpreted the new focus on questions of equity in global fora in 1999
(Marais, 1999)?
It is not completely unlikely that the concerns of leaders il. la Schroder, Blair or Chirac are real
and honest - even if they might not be based exclusively on moral considerations and
altruism. As interdependent as the world has become, these leaders must be aware that the
North cannot just cut itself off from what goes on in the rest of the world. To marginalise
Africa further will be of no benefit to them in the long-run. On the contrary, the less the
continent and all other poor countries are able to cope with their problems themselves, the
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more it will be up to the rest of the world to support them. Enabling Africa and other poor
countries to tackle their problems as independently as possible will, in the end, payout to the
North. Jeffrey Sachs, as a consequence, criticises the US, saying that by not stabilising their
annual amount of official development aid, which is far below the internationally agreed 0.7%
margin already, indeed by cutting it down year after year, the US does not seem to see that
"What's good for the poor is good for America" (Sachs, 2001: 48). Take the example of
Yugoslavia, where both Europe and the United States rejected the request of its last president,
Ante Markovich, for concessions in debt-servicing obligations and financial support in order
to stabilise its tom economy. Without this financial support, economic stabilisation failed, and
it was an easy task for Slobodan Milosevic to win the masses to his interest. In the end, it was
those who rejected help initially who then spent huge amounts of money on tackling the
results.
The need for the North to re-think the way the political economy is working and to take the
South more seriously in its needs and concerns is furthermore supported by both the North's
fear of rising migration of people heading to greener pastures and concern that poor countries
do not have the means to care about environmental problems that may have global
consequences. Academics have established a link not only between growing international
inequality but also inequality within states across the globe as an effect of globalisation.
(Broad and Cavanagh, 1995/96: 26; Wood, 1997). It is no longer true that the absolute line
dividing the winners and the losers of globalisation runs between the industrialised and the
poor part of the world. "As corporations and governments alike strive to compete globally by
cutting costs, the move to slash jobs [and working conditions] accelerates." (Broad and
Cavanagh, 1995/96: 27), and this is the case in virtually every country. So it is not only
developing countries' governments that have to struggle with the negative impact of
globalisation on their population, but also Europe and the United States who are discovering
unemployment as serious challenges to social welfare systems and government budgets, and
ultimately their own internal stability. Growing anti-globalisation sentiments are not just the
result of discontent with the way poorer countries and their populations are affected by this
process, but also by growing dissatisfaction with the changes in the political economies of the
industrialised world. In this way, Northern governments are also more and more under
pressure to justify their macro-economic policies to their own constituencies.
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What the industrialised world might start to realise, apart from this, is that better co-operation
with less advanced economies can bring precious synergy effects. With the importance of
knowledge in todays economy and the nature of knowledge as a public good, its spread will
ultimately be of greater benefit to the North than a restrictive use. The latter prevents it from
spiralling into greater absolute benefits. Integrating less developed countries into the global
economy might produce a stimulus to many industrialised countries' economies suffering
from diminishing growth figures. Consequently, a change to relative benefit thinking in
international relations might eventually be of greater benefit for saturating economies to
increase the welfare of their constituencies than the persistence on relative advantage
thinking. Finally, a better integration of the periphery would bring more consistency between
what developed nations are proclaiming with their promotion of (neo- )liberalism and their
actual behaviour. By not practising what they are preaching, rich nations are working against
their own interests. Uplifting the South, on the other hand, might not only mean a safer world,
but could even make it a more prosperous place for all (see Sachs, 2001: 49).
It is certainly possible that such thinking is behind the recent moves of the G-8 to co-operate
on more equal terms with the less powerful of this world to give them a seat at their annual
summits. Particularly Mbeki has, according to Alan Fine, "for the likes of Tony Blair,
Gerhard Schroder and George Bush - as with predecessor Bill Clinton - ...[become] the
developing world's man with whom they would most like to do business." (Fine, 2001, 9) But
has he truly "helped prompt a perceptible shift in their agenda"? (Business Day, 2001d: 13)
4. GENOA - ON THE ROAD TO EQUITY?
The New Africa Initiative enjoyed a very positive reception by the G-8 leaders at their annual
summit in Genoa. In general, their presidents and heads of government expressed their
support for Africa's plans. Already before the meeting to which the creators of the NAI,
Mbeki, Nigeria's Obansanjo, Algeria's Bouteflika and Senegal's Wade, supported by
Kounare of Mali and the representatives of Bangladesh and El Salvador, were invited as
special guests, Mbeki had lobbied for the New Initiative, which to a great extent carries his
trademark, in bilateral meetings with G-8 members. The plan to move towards an African
Union, manifested at the OAV summit in early July 2001, was supposed to give the
movement from Africa another layer of credibility.
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Everybody, including the United States, gave their approval to Mbeki and his African
colleagues and promised to help Africa in its struggle to overcome conflicts and instability
and build stable economies through investment in human development, technology and other
infrastructure, improvement of the diversification of exports, as well as the development of
financing and investment mechanisms. Mbeki did not have to go out of his way to get this
approval. On the contrary, the world's leaders seemed to embrace Africa's proposal virtually
with open arms, while outside the meeting anti-globalisation protesters made their case in
what emerged as the most violent outbreak of the movement since its inception in 1999 in
Seattle. In fact, what happened on the streets of Genoa virtually competed with spectators's
attention on what the officials negotiated in their highly exclusive circle. Even in the
aftermath, the events outside evoked more reaction than the outcomes of the meeting.
The civil society and partly less-organised crowd of protesters did not achieve their goal of
impeding the meeting fundamentally, and with the measures planned for upcoming summits,
it cannot be foreseen whether they will meet their goal in the immediate future. What they did
achieve, however, was to put the spotlight on the questionable legitimacy of the rich G-7 club
plus Russia and system of world governance. While those who agreed to grant a Marshall
Plan for Africa, as Tony Blair interpreted the NAI, comprise only a minority of the world, the
guest speakers 'without vote' from the developing world represented more than two thirds of
the global population. Before their pledge was heard, the big powers had focused on the
problem of the global economic slowdown - with the traditional exclusion ofnon-G-8s.
4.1 The G-8's Reaction to the Ideological Backlash
Confronted with this legitimacy problem, to a great extent, by their own national
constituencies' and the problem as to "how to discredit, weaken, manipulate and, if possible,
annihilate the international citizens' movement which has disturbed the gatherings of the
masters of the universe since Seattle" (George, 2001), the G-8 tried, by its attempt to portray
the Genoa summit as an anti-poverty summit, to point out that they were not only making
policies in favour of a wealthy minority. They intended to disprove the accusation that rich
countries would not sufficiently take recognition of the poor and their needs (Business Day,
2001a: 4; Friedman, 2001). Not least, the German Press Agency, dpa, saw the fact that the
3 The protesters in Genoa were by no means only from developing countries but particularly from G-7 countries.
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poor were even invited to Genoa as the direct consequence of the growing anti-globalisation
protests and demonstrations. (Dpa-online, 2001) "[E]xpanding the G8 to the G20 ... might
defuse the protests against developed-world institutions, like the G8, by making them less of a
target." (Mills, in: The Star, 2001). However, while activists made their voices and anger
attract attention, the meeting went on in the normal fashion, with participants affirming the
importance of unhindered markets and reacting to the chaos on the streets merely by agreeing
to downsize future high-profile meetings of this kind and hold them - similar to the upcoming
WTO talks in Doha - in remote and difficult areas to for protesters to access.
4.2 The New Dimension of Genoa - Basis for Success?
Thabo Mbeki and the rest of the African delegation returned to their countries satisfied faces.
But what had they actually achieved? To be sure, in Genoa North-South dialogue entered a
new dimension, but this was due to the new negotiating stance of the South rather than the
acts of the North. For the first time, the South, with Mbeki at its head, negotiated not as an
opponent to the North but as an ideological partner. Africa did not just come as a petitioner
merely asking for financial support, but as an 'understanding co-operater trying additionally
to show its own commitment and to establish credibility for its ambitious programme to adjust
to, and prepare itself better for, the new realities of globalisation. In this way, there was
nothing of the traditional North-South tension present. In fact, one could say that the North
South 'conflict' was openly buried in Genoa, the new tactics - and considering what was
explained in Chapter II even conviction - of the marginalised being to comply with the rules
of globalisation as the best means to help themselves out of the current economic and social
despair.
The interruption of the current process of North-South dialogue along traditional lines, as is
the aim of the globalisation activists, is in this regard not seen as in the interests of the
developing world. Almost ironically, the African leaders in Genoa would probably not have
hesitated for too long before agreeing to George Bush's statement that "The demonstrators are
condemning people to poverty." (emphasis added) (George, 2001). This being so, it is not
difficult for the G-8 to give the New Africa Initiative a go-ahead. Many of the plans of the
programme will - if successful - also develop to their own benefit. And what more can they
want than an Africa that wants to take its fate into its own hands? Apart from this, the G-7
plus Russia cannot have fundamental problems with Mbeki's plans. In the end, the Initiative
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does not call for major changes in North-South relations, since the concessions Africa is
asking for are minor and not nearly as fundamental as the New International Economic Order
of the 1970s (Nel and Taylor, forthcoming). This is why Mbeki actually has more chances of
pushing his programme through with the North than did the NIEO.
For the G-8 and all the global institutions under their dominant leadership, which have to find
credible ways of re-establishing their legitimacy after the Seattle Ministerial Conference in
1999, this move from Africa comes like a gift from heaven. With their modest request for
support, the African delegation factually "enabled the G-8 to make a caring gesture to the
developing world" (emphasis added) (Business Day, 2001d: 13).
To the protesting crowd and increasingly critical society, the G-8 can show both that they are
co-operating with those that were for decades virtually voiceless, and that they do care about
what they are requesting. By requesting help from the rich nations, the global South, via their
representatives, actually approves of the order they find themselves in. They do not condemn
the project of neo-liberalism, put into place under US hegemony, but merely ask to be more
integrated into it. In this way, it is the South itself which legitimises the hegemonic project of
neo-liberalism and the dominance of the wealthy.
After exploring the net outcomes of Genoa and taking a closer look at the G-8's behind the
scenes reactions to Mbeki and the rest of the African delegation, the picture is less rosy than
at first sight. Certainly, there is discussion and cautious signs of commitment among the G-8,
driven by Italy's Foreign Minister Renato Ruggiero, US trade representative Robert Zoellick
and Japan's Economy Minister Heizo Takenaka, to continue greater recognition of the
periphery's interests, particularly by giving them a seat at their annual meetings. Whether this
seat will be one which can be taken seriously or simply constitute a spectator membership as
well as other details of the agreement, have been left for later discussion. What was heralded
as a great achievement for Mbeki was in fact negligible. The agreement on debt relief was just
another example of lip service on the part of Bush and his (neo- )liberal allies. It did not
exceed the commitments under the HIPC Initiative, which has proven to be too far from
progressive. With $1.2 billion announced to be made available for the fight against HIV/Aids
and other illnesses, this sum also stays far below what is actually needed to make progress on
this terrain. The judgement of the altruistic nature of any move in this regard must
furthermore be interpreted while considering that "Success in the battle against Aids will
ultimately benefit the global economy and the rich world" (Business Day, 2001d: 13). Apart
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from this, the whole 'Marshall Plan for Africa' has so far remained largely unconcrete and
lacking in detail (Friedman, 2001), thus having a high potential to become just another
declaration of the North to help the poor, without substance. Seen like this, the promises given
by the G-8 in Genoa cannot count as a milestone in North-South co-operation.
4.3 Africa's (In)Credibility
The North has its reasons for hesitating to take Africa as serious and wholly credible. How
can it have full confidence in the well-sounding intentions of a selected group of
representatives while conflict continues in 13 countries and many are a far cry from
implementing democratic rule? The OAU foreign ministers' decision at their summit in
Lusaka in early July 2001 to defend Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe and his questionable method
of redistributing white-owned land without compensation, against British criticism at that
time, did not help send the message up North that Africa is truly acting according to what it is
trying to convince others of. (Business Day, 2001f: 7). It also does not contribute to Mbeki's
case for Africa's new commitment to the rule of democracy if he then attends meetings of
organisations whose heads have just changed their country's constitution to run a third term,
as was the case with the SADe summit in early August, headed by the president of Malawi.
Reason enough for the North to doubt Mbeki's credibility, without having spoken of his
reputation as an HIV/Aids denier in the North, where he is best known for not taking the fight
against the lethal disease that is projected to become the greatest barrier to development in
due course, particularly in a country such as South Africa which has the highest absolute
infection rate in the world. With co-operation partners like this, argues dpa, even an amount
of$10 billion for a new health funds is "peanuts" in the fight against Aids (Dpa-online, 2001).
What, indeed, is Mbeki himself doing to get rid of corruption in his own country? Talking of
a new Africa is good, and realising what must be taken in hand an even better step towards
economic and social improvement, but it is by far not enough. "If Africa is to enjoy a
sustained recovery, deserving of aid, worthy of debt relief and attractive to foreign
investment, countries must pursue the path to democracy and adopt sound macro-economic
policies," as the Financial Times believes, adding that "[t]his rules out most of the nations
assembled in Lusaka" (Business Day, 2001c: 9) "Particularly those poor countries from sub-
Saharan Africa represented in Genoa", affirms dpa, "are examples that a high degree of
Africa's crisis is home-made". (own translation) (Dpa-online, 2001). No wonder US officials
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reacted with scepticism when they heard about the "self-policing" intentions of Mbeki's
recovery plan in May this year. "It is very hard to believe African countries will condemn
fellow governments that do not do the right thing", the officials commented with regards to
MAP (Business Day, 2001e).
In such an environment, the visionary plans of an African Union are unlikely to help Africa
make its case. While the European Union, a group of 15 geographically proximate and in term
of culture relatively homogeneous countries with a high level of economic activity and
integration, is struggling to co-ordinate its monetary policies, the ambitious ideas of an
African Union must evoke serious doubts about the credibility of the continent and its leaders.
4.4 New Hope for the Poor?
With all. the questions about the likelihood of the North to make a real and honest
commitment towards Mbeki's vision, it should not be forgotten to ask whether it would
actually make sense if they did. If the G-8 really conceded to what Mbeki is asking for, would
it make a tangible difference to Africa and those who need it most? As outlined above, one of
Mbekis motivations to engage in this global change programme is the pressure from his
alliance partners at home to achieve social and economic upliftment of the poor. This concern
for the less privileged was assumed to have been the driving force enticing him to get the
Commonwealth members to adopt the 'Fancourt Declaration on Globalisation and People-
Centred Development' in November 1999. If one compares this picture Mbeki is trying to
paint with what he is actually doing when meeting his colleagues from North America and
Europe, there are indeed grounds for the assumption that he is doing all this merely to give
himself a positive personal image.
By giving in to the pressures of the global economy and - pronouncedly - trying to achieve the
betterment of the poor's living standards by pursuing an economic development along the
principles of the Washington Consensus and by embracing globalisation even more, Mbeki
will achieve exactly the opposite. It is inherent in the logic of globalisation that the system
works against those who already have few possibilities and means at hand, who cannot live up
to the requirements of the market and compete in order to improve their situation. Instead,
such an approach will only serve the global elite (Barrell, 2000b; Nel and Taylor,
forthcoming). Studies on the widening of the international and national income gaps give
expression to this problem. Globalisation serves capital in achieving ever bigger profits.
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Public health and security systems, human resource development, and other government
spending on the basic needs of its population, such as formal housing, running water and
electricity, are, on the contrary, irreconcilable with public austerity. It is as difficult to achieve
better lives for the employed work force through deregulating an already minorly regulated
market. Making this point, Howard Barrell criticises the ANC for being
"irrevocably tied to a neo-liberal policy regime that cares more about the profiteering interests of
investors than it does for the basic needs of workers ... it is the retrogressive change to basic
conditions 'scrapping overtime pay for Sunday work and the prospect of increasing normal
working hours' that shows the extent to which the ANC has gone in betraying the black working
class." (Barrell, 2000b)
Admittedly, there are many cases in which liberalisation and privatisation policies do bring
benefits. The crucial question that has to be asked here, and which Mbeki and his
globalisation-embracing African allies dedicate too little thinking to, is whom these measures
eventually benefit. There is ample evidence to show that the benefits of globalisation policies
are most unequally distributed - and the indications of a trickle-down effect are not apparent,
and so there are few signs of a better-off Africa.
Sharing views with leading European 'social democratic' politicians about third ways
between polarised positions and interests, as Mbeki is doing with his British colleague Tony
Blair, does not present the solution when this third way is in fact nothing more than a
conservative programme wrapped in a mantle of social democratic rhetoric. In this way, the
NAI has to be called counter-productive to its own aims. It will achieve exactly that which it
is - supposedly - trying to fight against, the marginalisation and dependence of Africa and the
entire South. Giving the latter a greater voice and audience in multilateral fora does not make
the world a more equitable place.
5. THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS ON THE UNITED STATES - EFFECTUAL SPIN ON THE
WHEEL?
and ideological
underpinnings aside, timing should playa great supporting role for his case. Whereas the
NIEO was introduced into a political environment which was little conducive to the
advancement of its case, it seems that the opposite holds for Mbeki' s new world dream. A
picture of this has already been sketched above. The terrorist attacks on the United States of
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September 11 2001, which made the world feel the dimensions of global inter-connection
even more, might evolve as a trigger to tum the current reformist tendencies and expressions
of a less hierarchical global community into more effective action. The event has given a push
to discussions about the unequal global distribution of power and US hegemony. Peter Vale
interpreted the developments in the United States as implying the need for the United States at
least to "reconsider its simple-minded approach to the world" (Vale, 2001: 22).4
What the terrorist attacks did, apart from exemplifying the need for change in the conduct of
international affairs, was to raise awareness that what goes on in other parts of the world is
indeed of relevance. It certainly made people feel that issues such as poverty alleviation and
the fight against marginalisation are to be taken seriously as global public goods, not simply
for the benefit of an unfortunate majority of less privileged. The Institute of Development
Studies at the University of Sussex for instance has plans to incorporate the implications of
the event into its further research and work in development. Poverty alleviation is among the
issues on which the institute is planning to focus greater attention, and this not only because
of calculations of the impact of the tragedy, that it will be the poor in Africa and other parts of
the world that will feel the long-term effects of the crisis most (University of Sussex, 2001).
6. CONCLUSION
That the long-term prosperity of the North is dependent on the development of the South does
not represent a new paradigm. The Brandt Reports have emphasised this already in the early
1970s. Still, this did not at that time trigger any change in the power play of the North, which
has not given up pursuing relative gains in favour of more global interests. "All attempts by
the UN ... to establish a new and just international economic relationships have unfortunately
failed because they were sabotaged by the rich. The last such attempt was seen in the activity
of the well-known Brandt Commission for the South ...." (Mitrovic, 1999: 4).
Looking at the real outcomes of the 2001 G-8 summit in Genoa, the prospects that this
situation will change are scant, even though there are more and more reasons why a change
from the highly polarised working of the global political economy will also bring vital
4 Bjorn Hettne states that the September 11 attacks and its consequences could act as a trigger for the
transformation of the current world order. These expectations derive from the fact that a war such as the war
which the United States declared against Afghanistan, are key events through which the emergence of new
orders are enhanced (Hettne, 2001).
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benefits to the industrialised part of the world. Such gloomy prospects do not automatically
mean that there are no moves at all towards a more equal say in global governance issues.
The G-8 are under increasing pressure to justify their legitimacy to determine global
outcomes. Due to this increasing pressure, which found its severest expression in Genoa, they
seem to be realising more and more that they have to make a move towards a more integrative
global order if they want to maintain their power. This is surely in their interest. To concede a
few adjustments to the system in favour of the South will be bearable and serve the
maintenance of the fundamental underpinnings of the current system. In fact, it serves their
case to bring the developing world on board and thus to close the legitimacy gap in global
governance that has been receiving increasing criticism in recent years. By not asking for a
fundamental restructuring of the system, but merely coming to the table as petitioners
requesting financial support and more equal say, Mbeki and his African colleagues are
legitimising the contemporary international order. In this way, the new initiatives from the
South are helping to strengthen this order, and are not helpful in finding an alternative.
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1. SUMMARY
This study attempted to evaluate the prospects of Thabo Mbeki's ambition of ending the
economic and political marginalisation of developing countries in the global political
economy and achieving a more equitable world order, an ambition which he has been
pursuing with vigorously since he took over power from Nelson Mandela in June 1999. The
analysis took into consideration most recent events, such as the G-8 summit in Genoa of July
2001 where Mbeki was supported by other African leaders in lobbying for the New Africa
Initiative, and the impetus that the September 11 attacks on the United States gave to global
considerations about the attractiveness of creating a less polarised world through the active
eradication of poverty. In order to clarify what exactly it is that is under investigation and how
Thabo Mbeki is attempting to achieve this, a detailed overview of his programme, described
as the "Mbeki Global Initiative", has been given. In a second step, the various forces driving
him to engage in this process were identified prior to the actual evaluation. .
After Chapter I presented an outline of the background of the problem, the rationale for
undertaking up the study as well as the' method was provided. Chapter II laid the foundation
for the evaluation by clarifying the development, content and strategy of the programme that
Thabo Mbeki initiated. Before going deeper into the actual content of his programme for the
recovery of Africa and the entire South, the roots of his activity were traced back in order to
find out whether his global equity activism is rightfully associated with his person or whether
it is not, rather, just an implementation of a party-political programme. The study concludes
that, despite the fact that the ANC pointed out its committment for Africa and the rest of the
South as central objectives in South Africa's foreign policy since the early 1990s, it was
Thabo Mbeki who developed this project over the years and gave the South-policy the
importance it has achieved today. On the basis of this finding, it was argued that there is
justification for the contention that Thabo Mbeki has become a leading figure for the South in
its dialogue with the North. Other leaders have equally taken up the struggle for greater
recognition of Southern interests by the North, but it is Thabo Mbeki who stands out as the
protagonist in this campaign.
The content analysis of his programme, which he has been promoting at multiple international
fora, both of the South and the North, found that the programme contains a fundamental
inconsistency between the overarching, general vision and the objectives with which he is
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attempting to achieve it. Whereas Mbeki envisions the transformation of the current world
order in which poor countries have little say, the concrete programme, which takes the
character of a list of requests, remains far less revolutionary. Mbekis objectives have a very
pragmatic approach, mainly trying to tackle 'traditional' problems of developing countries,
such as debt relief, aid and investment. Objectives of such a nature can ultimately merely help
to mitigate the adverse effects of globalisation, but not to reverse the disadvantaged position
of the South in international affairs, since such pragmatic objectives do not allow the South to
break out of the current functional framework of international affairs. Mbeki makes no
attempt at finding alternatives to the processes underlying the phenomenon of globalisation
and, ultimately, the reasons for the economic deterioration of the greater part of developing
countries. Consequently, Mbeki's programme merely aims at 'minor tinkering' of the global
order, addressing the symptoms rather than the actual problem. On the basis of the content of
the programme, Mbeki will not be able to achieve what he has in mind: the transformation of
the system which is characterised by a skewed distribution of capabilities and power.
The strategy with which Mbeki is mobilising for his idea takes the form of a dual approach;
first, to effect greater unification of the South, bringing it solidly behind his programme in
order to pose a greater counterweight against the North, particularly at negotiations such as
multialteral trade talks, where rich countries have traditionally been better able to push
through their interests; and, second, to lobby with the powerful and convince them of his case
so as to achieve their support. This he has been doing through mobilising speeches at various
international meetings and summits, where he often featured prominently as the single
representor of the South.
In order to determine what is driving Thabo Mbeki and what is the actual aim behind his
activism, explanations in existing literature have been identified and ordered according to
different categories of explanations. Three different levels have been analysed, and all three
were found to generate an impetus for him to become equity-active on a global scale. On the
individual level, the analysis of Mbeki' s personality, on the basis of biographical data and
information, explains his equity activity. He has dedicated a great part of his life to the fight
against inequality in South Africa's political system. Now that equality has formally been
achieved, there is a motivation for him to continue this struggle on a global scale. Possible
reasons for the pragmatic approach that his programme is taking can be found in his
personality - he has often been portrayed as a moderate rather than a radical, co-operative
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rather than confrontative - but can also be linked to his personal views on the nature of the
global political economy. For Mbeki, globalisation is a fact, an objective phenomenon which
cannot be reversed. This view is given expression in his "Global Initiative" programme, which
does not even try to overcome the process which is in many respects responsible for growing
poverty and the deterioration of living conditions of the less priviledged, since there is 'no
alternative' to it.
The domestic level analysis began with the observation that Mbeki's equity foreign policy is
not consistent with domestic policies and revealed that contentious societal forces in South
Africa have pushed him to pursue a foreign policy of poverty alleviation and the upliftment of
the disadvantaged. South Africa adopted a corporatist compromise as a 'crisis response'
during the early transformation period. Since Mbeki is convinced that the implementation of
the Washington Consensus is the only way to go for South Africa domestically, and thus
serving capital, not labour, despite the latter's alliance with the ANC, he is virtually forced to
find a way to concede to the policy demands raised by labour. Since it is not possible for him
to serve two conflicting interests in domestic politics, the international arena becomes the
conductor for the pressure imposed by the alliance partners. By pushing for the rights of the
poor on a global scale, he can prove to labour that, despite domestically implementing neo-
liberal macroeconomic policies, he has not given in to capital fully but is still committed to
the bigger part of his constituency, the less priviledged and poor.
The international system is another source of explanation for Mbeki's activism. As a country
with two faces, one of the developed world and one of poverty, South Africa is not only
ideally positioned to be a negotiator between the North and the South, but there are even
expectations projected on the country to become a mediator between the two global blocks.
As an emerging middle power, South Africa is interested in a stable international order. Not
able to opt out of this order, a middle power serves to stabilise - even legitimise - existing
order. Thabo Mbeki is thus not only allowed, but even welcomed by the North to take the role
he has taken internationally.
The fourth chapter evaluated "Mbeki's Global Initiative" by investigating it in depth as well as
by interpreting what happened - and why - at the latest G-8 summit in July 2001 in Genoa. At
this important summit, Mbeki, together with a delegation of other African leaders, presented
the New Africa Initiative, a merger between Mbeki's Millennium Plan for the Recovery of
Africa and Senegal's President Wade's Omegaplan. Analysis reveals that Mbeki and his
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supporters from the developing world will not be successful in achieving the transformation of
the current international system. Firstly, it is not within the power of the South to decide about
such a transformation, and secondly those that can effect change do not have an interest in
sharing with the South their power to determine global political and economic outcomes. The
recent moves by the North to show greater co-operation with the South - in the most concrete
form by inviting Southern leaders to their meetings and the plans to incorporate them in a G-
20 - must rather be interpreted as measures to re-establish their legitimacy, which has
increasingly been questioned. Secondly, transformation is not what Mbeki is actually trying to
achieve. On the contrary, he and his Southern allies only ask for better integration into the
system, in other words, only a reform of the current order, while the broader framework, the
underpinnings of this order, remain untouched. In doing this, they may even become helpful to
the North, currently under pressure to justify its hegemony, by legitimising the current order
of the system.
2. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Thabo Mbeki's project of ending the marginalisation of the South is not only praiseworthy
and highly commendible, but in view of the ever growing discrepancy between the haves and
the have-nots, more than necessary - not just for those that are actually suffering, but for the
entire system. A system with a widening gap between the better-and-better off on the backs of
the worse-and-worse off can - in the long run - not be sustained. Such polarisation must
sooner or later lead to a destabilisation of the entire system. This can neither ~~ in the South's
nor in the North's interest. In view of such problems, the efforts that rich countries are making
to 'help' overcome this problem are not adequate. For decades, the North managed to keep the
South at arm's length, making half-hearted promises of which they implemented only a few.
On the basis of the above analysis of the outcomes of the 2001 G-8 summit in Genoa, there is,
so far, still no real change in sight, despite the various pressures from both (civil) society and
the system. The terrorist attacks on the United States of September 2001 might have the
potential to give a spin to the wheel of change in global affairs, but it is as yet too early to
know if this will be the case or not.
Just as the efforts of the North are not sufficient, neither is what Mbeki and his colleagues are
aiming at sufficient. With their programme as it is constructed at the moment, they might
perhaps elicit some more minor concessions from the North and a slight improvement of the
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current situation of their political marginalisation in world affairs. However, Mbeki and his
colleagues are giving in too easily to the power play of the G-7. After all, they have welcomed
the outcomes of Genoa as a great gesture. With its modest behaviour already winning praise,
the North does not really have great incentives to stretch too far in its' co-operation' with the
South.
Certainly, Mbeki knows that he does not really increase his chances of being heard by the
powerful if he confronts them with the demand to give up their power. In this way, his
approach is wise and - measured against its objectives - probably more effective in the end.
But he must be aware that by doing what he is doing he is never going to change the real
problem and the r-eal source of the global division between rich and poor, the fundamental
problem of his approach being his assumptions about globalisation. There can hardly be
anything more un-logical than to react to a problem as severe as the degradation of the living
conditions of the majority of the African population and so many others in poor countries
outside the continent by confirming exactly that which is causing it. In this way, instead of
leading to any change, his policy is more self-reinforcing. It prevents, in the end, the changes
that it proclaims to be aimed at and will perpetuate the marginalisation of those who do not
have the means to succeed in a globalised world.
Besides this, instead of putting his and all other marginalised countries' fate virtually entirely
into the hands of the North, Mbeki should not forget the endogenous potential of achieving
change. To talk to the G-7 whenever he can is wise and, tactically, certainly necessary. Above
all, however, he should not neglect what is happening in his own country while abroad.
Mobilising and motivating one's constituency and giving them a perspective as well as
executing a consistent policy on the continent, which can then be taken seriously, is certainly
as important as asking for debt cancellation, equal say in global organisations or the far away -
and rather scepticism-evoking - plans to built an African Union. Surely, this attempt must be
interpreted as one pillar of working towards Africa's betterment and is intended to send
signals of commitment and unity. This qualitatively new approach in North-South relations,
the realisation that Africa must contribute with sound political conditions at home for its
situation to improve, is an important step towards change which Thabo Mbeki has to be
credited with. However, implementation in his own country as well as in his foreign policy
towards other African countries must follow.
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3. OUTLOOK
The first real test for the' new committment' of the North towards the South will be in Doha,
late this year, where the second attempt to start a new round of WTO trade talks is supposed
to start. Then, it will become evident whether America and Europe are truly committed to the
poor or whether Genoa must indeed be regarded as just another talk-shop. Surely, there are
more factors at hand in multilateral trade talks which prevent better outcomes for poor
countries than a simple reluctance on the part of industrialised countries (see Nairn, 2001: 16).
Still, it is of no use to promise and preach of a 'more social' world in which opportunities are
distributed more equally, if there is no implementation of such rhetoric - and equitable trade
is one of the main mechanisms through which this can be achieved.
If one believes Hein Marais, then today the "Group of Seven industrialised countries seem
more prone to relent slightly". For real change to happen, however, more than slight relent is
necessary, since the extent, he continues, "would be determined mainly by where the US
draws the line of shifting the sands" (Marais, 1999). Thus, there rests great responsibility on
the United States' shoulders. As long as they, however, do not realise that the eradication of
poverty is a global public good, real, structural change, is not in sight. To realise this, the
United States needs a visionary leader who is strong enough to put America's interest
alongside the common global goal.
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